[tor-bugs] #7167 [Pluggable transport]: Combine traffic obfuscation with address diversity of flash proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7167: Combine traffic obfuscation with address diversity of flash proxy
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
     Reporter:  karsten          |      Owner:  asn
         Type:  project          |     Status:  needs_revision
     Priority:  normal           |  Milestone:
    Component:  Pluggable        |    Version:
  transport                      |   Keywords:  SponsorF20131101 flashproxy
   Resolution:                   |  Parent ID:
Actual Points:                   |
       Points:                   |
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:38 dcf]:
 > What I propose to do about this: Let's push conns on a stack, rather
 than a queue. When a new external connection comes in, it is put on top of
 the stack. When a new internal connection comes in, it is assigned the
 most recently seen address, the one at the top of the stack. Zombie
 connections that somehow didn't survive the proxy chain to make an
 internal connection will remain at the bottom of the stack, and never
 assigned to any ExtORPort connection (and we can just prune them if they
 get too old).

 I implemented the stack idea and am now running it on the relay. See
 comment:17 for how to see the code and run a client against it.

 I did some review and polishing of the server code and I think it's ready
 for beta-level testing now.

 I think we should move the bamsoftware.com repository to
 git.torproject.org and call it something other than obfs-flash. I created
 #9743 for that.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7167#comment:39>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online