[tor-bugs] #9713 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Users report HTTPS Everywhere 0.development.11 in some sort of clients1.google.com loop?
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Sep 11 23:00:08 UTC 2013
#9713: Users report HTTPS Everywhere 0.development.11 in some sort of
clients1.google.com loop?
--------------------------------------+----------------------
Reporter: erinn | Owner: micahlee
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: EFF-HTTPS Everywhere | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords:
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by cypherpunks):
Replying to [comment:3 erinn]:
> I still haven't been able to trigger it at all. FWIW, I'm using Debian
(unstable).
[[BR]]
Further to [comment:2 comment 2], I've tried Debian Testing amd64 in
VirtualBox. The problem is identical. I've even dug up an ancient, much
slower Windows XP machine, and it's just the same there. So, it doesn't
seem to be a timing issue.
Erinn, I've got to ask: Do you have Online Certificate Status Protocol
disabled in your Tor Browser? That, of course, also stops the problem
from occurring.
I've now had a look at the Google Services ruleset. It does re-write for
the clients1.google.com domain.
{{{
<rule
from="^http://(apis|appengine|books|calendar|cbks0|checkout|chrome|clients[12]|code|[\w-]+\.corp|developers|dl|docs\d?|drive|encrypted
|encrypted-
tbn[123]|feedburner|fiber|gg|glass||health|helpouts|history|(?:hosted)?talkgadget|investor|lh\d|(?:chatenabled\.)?mail|pack|pki|play|plus(?:\.sandbox)?|plusone|productforums|profiles
|safebrowsing-cache|cert-test\.sandbox|sb-
ssl|script|security|servicessites|sites|spreadsheets\d?|support|talk|tools)\.google\.com/"
to="https://$1.google.com/" />
}}}
I edited that rule to remove "clients[12]|", put an edited copy of the
ruleset in the HTTPSEverywhereUserRules directory in Tor Browser's profile
and disabled the copy built in to the extension. The problem went away.
I don't think HTTPS Everywhere should be touching any of the requests that
are part of OCSP. All responses that are not error codes are signed
anyway.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9713#comment:6>
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