[tor-bugs] #5595 [Tor]: Some relays tried to refetch maatuska's new certificate repeatedly
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Thu May 9 16:38:00 UTC 2013
#5595: Some relays tried to refetch maatuska's new certificate repeatedly
------------------------------------+---------------------------------------
Reporter: rransom | Owner: andrea
Type: defect | Status: needs_revision
Priority: critical | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: tor-relay 023-backport | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
------------------------------------+---------------------------------------
Comment(by andrea):
Replying to [comment:18 nickm]:
> Looks good! Here's what I saw while reading it.
>
> I'd like to request basic unit tests on the fp_pair_t map code.
>
> fp_pair_map_{set,get}_by_digests could save some duplicated code by
being a wrapper on fp_pair_map_{set,get}.
Okay, I'll do those.
> Should we still be calling "authority_cert_dl_failed" from
trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string? Even if so, I 'm not sure the
comment in front of that point starting with "a duplicate on a download"
any more.
I don't think we should remove the check; there are probably still
possible edge cases where a duplicate cert might get downloaded. The
comment could stand rewording in light of fixing this bug, though.
> Should the log_warn in authority_cert_dl_failed be LD_BUG?
Changed.
> Does authority_cert_dl_looks_uncertain need a variant that looks at
id/sk failures? Or should it look at the number of id/sk failures itself?
No it doesn't; it's only called from
networkstatus_check_consensus_signature() which is concerned with the
trusted auth cert downloads.
> When constructing the fp_pair string, I would be much more comfortable
with something tor_asprintf()-based. I don't believe there are any bugs
in what you have now, but I want to get us out of the habit of doing
string construction like this.
Okay, changed.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5595#comment:19>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tor-bugs
mailing list