[tor-bugs] #5707 [Tor]: Use end to end stream timing data to further prune circuits

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#5707: Use end to end stream timing data to further prune circuits
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 Reporter:  mikeperry                                       |          Owner:  mikeperry         
     Type:  enhancement                                     |         Status:  assigned          
 Priority:  normal                                          |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component:  Tor                                             |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  SponsorZ performance needs-research tor-client  |         Parent:                    
   Points:                                                  |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by arma):

 All the researchers doing Tor anonymity analysis get really agitated when
 we add new path selection approaches that aren't based on global
 information. And assuming the congestion is inside the network, where
 you're connecting from shouldn't make a big impact. And finally, all these
 "local not global" approaches raise complex questions about an adversary
 who influences a target user's opinions to influence her paths.

 So the first question is, how well can we approximate your above plans
 with probers (a la bwauths)? And the followup question is, how much
 information do we need to put into e.g. the consensus for it to work?

 Also, you should know that Micah Sherr's 'virtual coordinate system' plan
 has some code somewhere, though I have so far failed to publically pry it
 out of them.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5707#comment:10>
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