[tor-bugs] #8596 [Tor]: Inconsistent addrmap events when resolving hostname (regression)
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Mar 27 18:43:15 UTC 2013
#8596: Inconsistent addrmap events when resolving hostname (regression)
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Reporter: Desoxy | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.4.11-alpha
Keywords: tor-client controller dns | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Tor 0.2.3.x would generate an ADDRMAP event for all addresses added to the
cache, and since all resolved IPv4 addresses were added to the cache, all
IPv4 addresses generated an ADDRMAP event. Ticket #7570 introduced
circuit-based separation of the DNS cache and "broke" that mechanism:
Resolves generated via the DNSPort or a control connection do not end up
in the cache and thus don't generate an ADDRMAP event. Also, when the
cache is disabled by adding the `SocksPort 9050 NoCacheDNS` to the torrc,
no ADDRMAP event is generated.
Git-bisect shows commit 7536c40e9641a0724f0c9e6f994306d762d37e4d[1]
introduced this problem.
First, we should be clear about when to generate ADDRMAP events. From the
control spec:
{{{
4.1.7. New Address mapping
These events are generated when a new address mapping is entered in
Tor's address map cache, or when the answer for a RESOLVE command is
found.
}}}
This would mean that DNS data retrieved for DNSPort queries or when
NoCacheDNS is set would not trigger an event. Do we want this behavior? Or
do we want to trigger ADDRMAP events for any mapping that is not already
in the cache, even if it is not going to be cached anyway?
1:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commitdiff/7536c40e9641a0724f0c9e6f994306d762d37e4d?hp=f33487668f16dbd7f95eaf8644865c28e1dd7036
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8596>
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