[tor-bugs] #7153 [Pluggable transport]: Don't require pluggable transport proxies to be SOCKS proxies
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Mar 11 18:55:54 UTC 2013
#7153: Don't require pluggable transport proxies to be SOCKS proxies
---------------------------------+------------------------------------------
Reporter: karsten | Owner: asn
Type: project | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Pluggable transport | Version:
Keywords: SponsorF20130228 | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
---------------------------------+------------------------------------------
Comment(by zwol):
Sorry for dropping the ball on this again.
Nick's proposal appears almost entirely orthogonal to the problems
StegoTorus has with doing SOCKS; it appears mostly about improving
communication between Tor and a controller process, which ST isn't. The
"configuration may be too large for a SOCKS connection request" issue,
which is probably the most important, is only addressed by saying that
it's okay to require use of SOCKS4a (which has no official upper limit)
and I do not feel comfortable relying on that; the actual implementation
in ST right now does have an upper limit (chosen arbitrarily, according to
comments) and I am concerned that pluggable transports may all pick
different arbitrary cutoffs and we'll have a big mess. My other concerns
(number of marshal/unmarshal passes, additional implementation costs of
having SOCKS code at all) do not seem to have been addressed at all.
I don't understand the stated objection to a "just start talking OR on
this local port" bridge method:
> (Tor really needs to have some idea when it's making connections to the
same bridge or not.)
Any given ST local-port talks to one and only one bridge, whose key
fingerprint is (optionally) specified on the "direct" Bridge line. This
would seem to be a non-problem.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7153#comment:20>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tor-bugs
mailing list