[tor-bugs] #8106 [Tor]: Make .onion addresses harder to harvest by directory servers

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#8106: Make .onion addresses harder to harvest by directory servers
-----------------------------+----------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  asn              |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect           |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  major            |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component:  Tor              |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  SponsorZ tor-hs  |         Parent:                    
   Points:                   |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by asn):

 Valet Services paper: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/valet:pet2006.pdf

 Here is the Valet Services scheme (as presented in
 subsection''Distributing Tickets'' of section ''3.2'') adapted to the
 current HS protocol:

 {{{
 a) HS finds the HSDirs responsible for it exactly like in the current HS
 protocol.
 b) HS uploads its descriptor symmetrically encrypted with key =
 H(onion+'1')
    HS also uploads an index for the descriptor, where index = H(onion+'2')
 }}}

 When a client wants to visit the HS:

 {{{
 a) The client derives the key and the index from the .onion.
 b) The client fetches the descriptor from the HSDir and decrypts it with
 the key.
 }}}

 A problem pointed out by Nick is that this turns HSDir into cloud storage
 servers, since anyone can upload anything to it.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8106#comment:4>
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