[tor-bugs] #9002 [Tor]: Clients should discard v2 HS descriptors with more than 10 intro points
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Jun 18 05:08:37 UTC 2013
#9002: Clients should discard v2 HS descriptors with more than 10 intro points
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Reporter: rransom | Owner: mikeperry
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: critical | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: 023-backport tor-hs | Parent: #9001
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by rransom):
Replying to [comment:7 andrea]:
> This patch looks reasonable to me; only thing to really question is the
choice of MAX_INTRO_POINTS. Do we know how hidden service reliability
varies as a function of the number of intro points to justify the choice
and the phrasing "(misguided) attempt to improve reliability" in the
warning?
Publishing more intro points in a descriptor should spread the circuit-
extension load of client intro circuits over more relays so that clients
are less likely to overload the intro-point relays. See #3825 for what
happens if clients do overload a relay; in short, if they fail to extend
their circuit to the intro point, they used to repeatedly try again, thus
keeping the relay overloaded. (I fixed that; now they only pound each
intro point a few times before giving up on it.)
The maximum number of intro points which will improve a hidden service's
reliability is 6, because each HS publishes its descriptor to at most 6
HSDir relays. I picked 10 as the maximum in #3825 because I wanted to
never have to worry about that bottleneck again.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9002#comment:9>
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