[tor-bugs] #7986 [Tor]: Lengthen the consensus validity interval
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Fri Feb 1 22:27:05 UTC 2013
#7986: Lengthen the consensus validity interval
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Reporter: nickm | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: tor-client 023-backport | Parent: #2681
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by arma):
I want to see us put this feature in. It would be good for Tor.
That said, I worry about several classes of bugs we're likely to see.
The most important class of bug is "decide we don't want a directory
object, throw it out, realize we want it, fetch it, goto step 0". If we
have some logic somewhere that decides a relay descriptor isn't useful if
it's 36 hours out-of-date, but we have one referenced from our consensus,
we're in for some sad times. I vaguely recall that in the past we had
exactly this issue: we had a plan to make it so if the descriptor is still
referenced by the consensus, it didn't matter if it was more than 24 hours
old. We nearly implemented that plan, but ran into problems of the sort in
this paragraph and backed out. I don't think we've fixed any of those
problems since then.
The less exciting but still relevant class of bug is "don't admit to
having a descriptor if it's more than 24 hours old". For example, we have
one of those right now with this branch:
networkstatus_getinfo_by_purpose() won't list any relays or bridges whose
descriptors are more than 24 hours old. What others do we have like that?
So, how to proceed? I think the most important question for me is how Tor
can recognize that it's hit one of the "drop and refetch and drop" bugs.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7986#comment:8>
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