[tor-bugs] #10095 [TorBrowserButton]: Setting screen resolution to a multiple of 200 x 100 is not working reliably with patch in #8478
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Tue Dec 17 13:19:02 UTC 2013
#10095: Setting screen resolution to a multiple of 200 x 100 is not working
reliably with patch in #8478
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Reporter: gk | Owner: mikeperry
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: critical | Milestone:
Component: TorBrowserButton | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tbb-fingerprinting
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by gk):
I have been looking into this for the last days and have not found a way
to solve this issue properly with extension means. The problem we face is
described pretty well by
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=870346#c1: The outerWindow
dimensions are set, then the window is made visible and then depending on
other extensions overlaying stuff the size of the innerWindow is adapted.
Thus, having a fixed innerWindow size regardless the overlayed content of
other extensions AND having the resizing we do not visible to the user is
currently not possible.
If we want to keep our current model (resizing the inner dimensions to a
multiple 200 x 100 and faking the outer dimensions accordingly) we have a
bunch of ad-hoc solutions for this ticket. We could:
1) Use only small icons
2) Craft a specific HTTPS Everyhwere icon that does not enlarge the chrome
area anymore
3) We could resize the window additionally with setTimeout(0)/or after
xul-overlay-merged got fired. Thus, if the innerwindow has no multiple of
200 x 100 anymore after other overlays got merged we would enlarge the
window a tiny bit again which would minimize the usability impact of it
(compared to the scenario where we would enlarge the window from its
original size to, say, 100 x 900 having the window already visible).
I am not happy with either of these stopgaps, though, for various reasons
(they don't solve the underlying issue; they won't be acceptable by
Mozilla; the user might shoot herself in the foot with installing just one
further legitimate extension...).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10095#comment:3>
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