[tor-bugs] #8710 [Tor]: Sybil selection should prefer measured over advertised bw

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#8710: Sybil selection should prefer measured over advertised bw
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 Reporter:  nickm                    |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect                   |         Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  normal                   |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component:  Tor                      |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  tor-auth 024-deferrable  |         Parent:                    
   Points:                           |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:4 arma]:
 > The sybil tie-breaker decision is meant to let us take the most useful
 relays from the set, and add those to the network. The choice of relay is
 not meant to be a security thing.

 !!?!??!

 That's a response to this sentence as a general comment. For the specific
 context, just as an off the top of the head example, wouldn't the concern
 you raised in #8163 apply? That is, run a node at the same IP address (not
 trivial I know but still could be in the same apartment building, etc. as
 you suggested). Then lie about the bandwidth and simultaneously add a
 hostile node while knocking a targeted honest node offline. Lots of
 attacks to build off that capability.

 -Paul

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8710#comment:6>
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