[tor-bugs] #3443 [Tor]: Client with low CBT can't establish any circuits
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Tue Nov 27 19:41:13 UTC 2012
#3443: Client with low CBT can't establish any circuits
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Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: regression tor-client MikePerry201211 | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints: 6
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Comment(by nickm):
Dumb question:
* I can't see what actually relaxes the timeout when relaxed_timeout is
set. It appears that the first time through the circuit_expire_building
loop, we set relaxed_timeout , but the next time through the loop, we'll
see that relaxed_timeout is already set, and call the "No circuits are
opened" log message", and go on. What's supposed to be happening here? I
thought the logic was that a relaxed_timeout circuit should get a more lax
timeout, but it seems like everybody's getting the same close_cutoff.
Should get fixed, not necessarily before merge:
* The new while loop in circuit_expire_building uses a silly form. It's
not necessary to have all this "victim" business when you're not modifying
the list of circuits-- the only reason to use that pattern is if you think
you might be removing "victim" from the list.
* In the later while loop in circuit_expire_building, you're checking
whether TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath is set, but earlier in the
function, you're doing "if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state ==
CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) {"
* Describe_status_for_controller probably wants to take the created time,
so as not to change its behavior.
* The documentation for timestamp_began and timestamp_created should
explain how they're different.
Other than that, if it's testing ok, I say it's mergeable.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3443#comment:45>
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