[tor-bugs] #7553 [Tor]: [simple patch] Expose ISO_STREAM via isolation flag config option
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Fri Nov 23 15:00:09 UTC 2012
#7553: [simple patch] Expose ISO_STREAM via isolation flag config option
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: unspecified
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: tor-client | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Changes (by proper):
* cc: adrelanos@… (added)
Comment:
Speaking for Whonix: [[BR]]
Applications are stream isolated. If they are not used, there will be no
traffic.
> rigging up something inferior by generating unique Socks credentials for
each request
Only per application and some SocksPorts with reasonable IsolateDestAddr
and/or IsolateDestPort options.
Sources: [http://whonix.sf.net/ Whonix]
[https://github.com/adrelanos/Whonix/blob/master/whonix_gateway/etc/tor/torrc
torrc]; [https://github.com/adrelanos/Whonix/ source code];
[http://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/wiki/Applications/#identity-correlation-
through-circuit-sharing stream isolation design]
Not speaking for Tails, but linking: [[BR]]
https://tails.boum.org/todo/separate_Tor_streams/
Don't ask me for the related Tails git commit.
> rigging up something inferior by generating unique Socks credentials for
each request
I don't think they do that either.
My general option about this feature: [[BR]]
Nice, if the network can handle the load. Those are pretty geeky options,
I don't think users bother with it and the abusers can already hack
together their own ISO_STREAM feature so not adding the feature isn't a
protection either. The Gini Is Out Of The Bottle.
I wouldn't activate it in Whonix for anyone else by default.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7553#comment:2>
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