[tor-bugs] #5753 [Analysis]: When we isolate streams by domain, can a local observer guess how many domains we visit?
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Mon May 7 03:51:38 UTC 2012
#5753: When we isolate streams by domain, can a local observer guess how many
domains we visit?
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Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Analysis | Version:
Keywords: | Parent: #5752
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by mikeperry):
This might be an interesting math problem to academics, but when compared
to the linkability at the exit node that can be used to totally
deanonymize you (for example, by issuing a subpoena to mail.google.com
and/or the equivalent iranian state run email provider to find out who
runs a twitter account accessed on the same circuit), it pales in
comparison.
Also, remember there's a 33% chance you'll use the same guard, even if you
don't use the same circuit. So 1/3 of your website visits will be no
different than the status quo anyways.
Further, the status quo is that local observers can probably simply
observe network activity vs silence to determine your domain visits, since
most humans navigate web pages relatively slowly compared to 3rd party
content sourcing rates.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5753#comment:2>
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