[tor-bugs] #5028 [Ooni]: Tor bridge scanning

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#5028: Tor bridge scanning
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 Reporter:  hellais  |          Owner:  runa                     
     Type:  project  |         Status:  assigned                 
 Priority:  normal   |      Milestone:  Sponsor F: March 15, 2012
Component:  Ooni     |        Version:                           
 Keywords:           |         Parent:                           
   Points:           |   Actualpoints:                           
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Comment(by asn):

 A TCP scan on a bridge from .kz would return a false positive, since the
 bridge actually gets blocked real-time on the SSL layer.

 An SSL scan on a bridge from .cn would return a false positive, since the
 bridge would get active-scanned and blocked afterwards.

 From discussing this with hellais the past few days, I think this ticket
 needs some more thought poured into it. Specifically, I think that the
 purpose of this project, the scanning method, and the subset of bridges
 to-be scanned could be specified better, before scanning all the bridges
 from a single computer in a censored country.

 Also, scanning of unpublished bridges should be of interest too.
 Also, I think that one of the main questions of this project should be
 "What common characteristics do the blocked bridges share, and why are the
 non-blocked bridges non-blocked?"

 PS: sorry for raiding the ticket

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5028#comment:21>
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