[tor-bugs] #6475 [Tor Client]: circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): Bug: Unexpectedly high circuit_successes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6475: circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): Bug: Unexpectedly high circuit_successes
-----------------------------+----------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  grarpamp         |          Owner:  mikeperry         
     Type:  defect           |         Status:  assigned          
 Priority:  major            |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Client       |        Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.19-rc  
 Keywords:  MikePerry201208  |         Parent:                    
   Points:                   |   Actualpoints:                    
-----------------------------+----------------------------------------------

Comment(by grarpamp):

 So far there are a handful of circuit_launch_by_extend_info():
 Cannibalizing circ for purposes 5, 6, 9.
 So far none that mention a named guard from the high success entries. Each
 run is obviously going to be different, and this one isn't complete.
 Actually, right now, I've only got one guard as high success, and it's not
 listed in the statefile either.
 I don't know much about what data you're looking for, so you might be best
 to compile a list of 300-400+ onions, then fire off 25-50 front page
 scrapes in parallel till the list is done. That way you can see what's
 going on, locally.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6475#comment:9>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online