[tor-bugs] #7202 [Tor]: Implement ntor handshake or its successor
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Tue Dec 18 03:22:39 UTC 2012
#7202: Implement ntor handshake or its successor
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Reporter: karsten | Owner:
Type: project | Status: needs_review
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: SponsorZ tor-relay | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by nickm):
Replying to [comment:16 mikeperry]:
> Thanks for the above. I'm reviewing the thread now. I just noticed this
from Ian:
>
> > The directory authorities should probably checks the B's anyway, just
to be sane. They should all have order exactly p_1, so check that
EXP(B,8) is not O, and check that EXP(B,p_1) is O.
>
> It seems everybody agreed this was a good idea, but I don't see these
checks in the ntor branch.
I didn't see it as a terribly great idea; it doesn't achieve anything
security-wise. If a malicious router wanted to use a broken key in this
way, it wouldn't actually be achieving anything other than letting anybody
else authenticate as it. But a malicious router could also just publish
or share its private key or session keys, and thereby achieve the same
result without getting detected. This is useful to check for a particular
set of bug in the routers, nothing more.
We can add another patch if need be, I guess. Can somebody tell me the
right value for p_1, or do I have to dig it out myself.
> There was also some additional discussion about proof of possession of
b, but everyone seemed to agree that was overkill (though it did remind me
of #5968).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7202#comment:18>
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