[tor-bugs] #3277 [Analysis]: Analyze how long after earning the HSDir flag relays go away
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Wed May 25 06:00:36 UTC 2011
#3277: Analyze how long after earning the HSDir flag relays go away
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Reporter: karsten | Owner:
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Analysis | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by karsten):
Replying to [comment:2 Sebastian]:
> These results are very interesting. They seem to show bug 1810, because
after 24+18 hours there's another big drop in relay availability, [...]
Note that the graph shows HSDir sessions between May 2010 and April 2011.
Not sure how much these are affected by #1810.
> [...] and they also seem to indicate that the move to 25 hours was a
good idea.
Actually, the drop from 0 to 1 hours doesn't look that unusual. I
attached another graph that contains "simulations" of assigning flags
after 25 and 26 hours. The idea of the simulations is simply to remove
all 0-hour sessions (all 0-hour and 1-hour sessions) and subtract 1 hour
(2 hours) from all other sessions. As you can see, the drop from 0 to 1
hour is still around 8 % (7 %). Of course, this comes at the cost of
having a smaller set of relays with the HSDir flag. So, it might have
been a good idea to change the requirement to 25 hours, but I think this
needs more analysis.
> I'm not exactly sure how the timings work out, I believe if you were
reachable at :15 but not at :30 or :45, you still get into the consensus
(I think there's a separate bug about that).
Okay. If there's such a bug, it might be relevant for interpreting the
results. But I'm afraid we can't make the analysis more precise, because
the only data we have are the consensuses.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3277#comment:3>
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