[tor-bugs] #3354 [Vidalia]: tor's auto bridge default and unintended Vidalia side effects
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Wed Jun 15 21:38:18 UTC 2011
#3354: tor's auto bridge default and unintended Vidalia side effects
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Reporter: erinn | Owner: chiiph
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: blocker | Milestone: Vidalia: 0.2.13
Component: Vidalia | Version: Vidalia: 0.2.12
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by arma):
Replying to [comment:19 anonym]:
> So what we would like for Tails is something that is not a hack. We've
already had a hack giving us what we want for quite some time, and the
whole idea of "fixing" UseBridges in Tor was to have a clean solution
without any hacks at all that is 100% consistent with normal Tor+Vidalia
(and preferably also TBB) behaviour. We also thought that such
functionality is highly usable outside the Tails context (like in TBB).
Hence it is a bit frustrating and surprising, at this late stage, to see
that during all this time this "fix" has been considered as something that
will turn out as a hack. If that's the way it will end up we don't care
about the resent change of UseBridges behaviour, so you can revert it and
we can continue to patch Vidalia to use our current hack (although that
truly would suck).
>
> Below I suggest something that would suit us, that is backwards-
compatible and AFAICT doesn't screw anyone:
I think the problem here stems from the fact that we silently changed
behavior for Tor users who have Bridges set but don't have UseBridges set.
In the past they wouldn't use the bridges when Tor starts; now they do. It
doesn't have anything to do with the proposed Vidalia changes (which sound
plausible).
So the reason I was calling it a hack is that in retrospect changing
usebridges to a tristate was probably not the right way to achieve the
goals you have in mind. I am increasingly thinking we should take out that
patch and put out a new Tor 0.2.2, so we don't change behavior for users.
At the same time we should ponder how to accomplish the goals you have in
mind.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3354#comment:20>
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