[tor-bugs] #4759 [Tor Hidden Services]: Rend circ corresponding to an intro circ is looked up improperly

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki torproject-admin at torproject.org
Thu Dec 22 11:22:51 UTC 2011


#4759: Rend circ corresponding to an intro circ is looked up improperly
---------------------------------+------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  rransom              |          Owner:  rransom           
     Type:  defect               |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  normal               |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor Hidden Services  |        Version:                    
 Keywords:                       |         Parent:                    
   Points:                       |   Actualpoints:                    
---------------------------------+------------------------------------------
 `rend_client_introduction_acked` uses
 `circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose` to look up the rendezvous circuit
 corresponding to an introduction circuit by its purpose and destination
 hidden service address.  Unfortunately, there may be multiple rendezvous
 circuits open with the same purpose (`CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY`) and
 destination hidden service address, especially with the proposal 171
 changes and (less so) the #3000 fix in recent Tors.
 `rend_client_introduction_acked` should look up the rendezvous circuit by
 its rendezvous cookie and DH public key instead.

 If this bug occurs, it may trigger the following log message on the client
 side in `rend_client_receive_rendezvous`:
 {{{
     log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Got rendezvous2 cell from hidden service, but
 not "
              "expecting it. Closing.");
 }}}
 However, the rend circ for which the `INTRODUCE1` cell was sent is likely
 to time out before the service reaches it.

 The fix for this bug might be worth backporting to 0.2.2.x.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4759>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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