[tbb-commits] [tor-browser] 62/66: Bug 23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion
gitolite role
git at cupani.torproject.org
Wed Aug 31 17:43:01 UTC 2022
This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.
richard pushed a commit to branch tor-browser-102.2.0esr-12.0-2
in repository tor-browser.
commit a940145efa12fa8e8ba9a48f2e673c969f4cd821
Author: Richard Pospesel <richard at torproject.org>
AuthorDate: Fri Jun 8 13:38:40 2018 -0700
Bug 23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion
Encrypting pages hosted on Onion Services with SSL/TLS is redundant
(in terms of hiding content) as all traffic within the Tor network is
already fully encrypted. Therefore, serving HTTP pages from an Onion
Service is more or less fine.
Prior to this patch, Tor Browser would mostly treat pages delivered
via Onion Services as well as pages delivered in the ordinary fashion
over the internet in the same way. This created some inconsistencies
in behaviour and misinformation presented to the user relating to the
security of pages delivered via Onion Services:
- HTTP Onion Service pages did not have any 'lock' icon indicating
the site was secure
- HTTP Onion Service pages would be marked as unencrypted in the Page
Info screen
- Mixed-mode content restrictions did not apply to HTTP Onion Service
pages embedding Non-Onion HTTP content
This patch fixes the above issues, and also adds several new 'Onion'
icons to the mix to indicate all of the various permutations of Onion
Services hosted HTTP or HTTPS pages with HTTP or HTTPS content.
Strings for Onion Service Page Info page are pulled from Torbutton's
localization strings.
---
browser/base/content/browser-siteIdentity.js | 61 +++++++++++++++++-----
browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js | 49 +++++++++++++++--
.../shared/identity-block/identity-block.css | 19 +++++++
dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp | 19 +++++++
dom/base/nsContentUtils.h | 5 ++
dom/base/nsGlobalWindowOuter.cpp | 3 +-
dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp | 4 +-
dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp | 6 ++-
dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp | 16 ++++--
.../modules/geckoview/GeckoViewProgress.jsm | 4 ++
security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp | 22 ++++++--
security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp | 14 ++++-
security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp | 13 +++--
security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp | 12 +++++
security/nss/lib/mozpkix/include/pkix/Result.h | 2 +
security/nss/lib/mozpkix/include/pkix/pkixnss.h | 1 +
16 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/browser/base/content/browser-siteIdentity.js b/browser/base/content/browser-siteIdentity.js
index 02fdb494d2908..64a806719a771 100644
--- a/browser/base/content/browser-siteIdentity.js
+++ b/browser/base/content/browser-siteIdentity.js
@@ -139,6 +139,12 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
);
},
+ get _uriIsOnionHost() {
+ return this._uriHasHost
+ ? this._uri.host.toLowerCase().endsWith(".onion")
+ : false;
+ },
+
get _isAboutNetErrorPage() {
let { documentURI } = gBrowser.selectedBrowser;
return documentURI?.scheme == "about" && documentURI.filePath == "neterror";
@@ -737,9 +743,9 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
get pointerlockFsWarningClassName() {
// Note that the fullscreen warning does not handle _isSecureInternalUI.
if (this._uriHasHost && this._isSecureConnection) {
- return "verifiedDomain";
+ return this._uriIsOnionHost ? "onionVerifiedDomain" : "verifiedDomain";
}
- return "unknownIdentity";
+ return this._uriIsOnionHost ? "onionUnknownIdentity" : "unknownIdentity";
},
/**
@@ -747,12 +753,18 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
* built-in (returns false) or imported (returns true).
*/
_hasCustomRoot() {
+ if (!this._secInfo) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
let issuerCert = null;
issuerCert = this._secInfo.succeededCertChain[
this._secInfo.succeededCertChain.length - 1
];
-
- return !issuerCert.isBuiltInRoot;
+ if (issuerCert) {
+ return !issuerCert.isBuiltInRoot;
+ }
+ return false;
},
/**
@@ -789,11 +801,17 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
"identity.extension.label",
[extensionName]
);
- } else if (this._uriHasHost && this._isSecureConnection) {
+ } else if (this._uriHasHost && this._isSecureConnection && this._secInfo) {
// This is a secure connection.
- this._identityBox.className = "verifiedDomain";
+ // _isSecureConnection implicitly includes onion services, which may not have an SSL certificate
+ const uriIsOnionHost = this._uriIsOnionHost;
+ this._identityBox.className = uriIsOnionHost
+ ? "onionVerifiedDomain"
+ : "verifiedDomain";
if (this._isMixedActiveContentBlocked) {
- this._identityBox.classList.add("mixedActiveBlocked");
+ this._identityBox.classList.add(
+ uriIsOnionHost ? "onionMixedActiveBlocked" : "mixedActiveBlocked"
+ );
}
if (!this._isCertUserOverridden) {
// It's a normal cert, verifier is the CA Org.
@@ -804,17 +822,27 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
}
} else if (this._isBrokenConnection) {
// This is a secure connection, but something is wrong.
- this._identityBox.className = "unknownIdentity";
+ const uriIsOnionHost = this._uriIsOnionHost;
+ this._identityBox.className = uriIsOnionHost
+ ? "onionUnknownIdentity"
+ : "unknownIdentity";
if (this._isMixedActiveContentLoaded) {
- this._identityBox.classList.add("mixedActiveContent");
+ this._identityBox.classList.add(
+ uriIsOnionHost ? "onionMixedActiveContent" : "mixedActiveContent"
+ );
} else if (this._isMixedActiveContentBlocked) {
this._identityBox.classList.add(
- "mixedDisplayContentLoadedActiveBlocked"
+ uriIsOnionHost
+ ? "onionMixedDisplayContentLoadedActiveBlocked"
+ : "mixedDisplayContentLoadedActiveBlocked"
);
} else if (this._isMixedPassiveContentLoaded) {
- this._identityBox.classList.add("mixedDisplayContent");
+ this._identityBox.classList.add(
+ uriIsOnionHost ? "onionMixedDisplayContent" : "mixedDisplayContent"
+ );
} else {
+ // TODO: ignore weak https cipher for onionsites?
this._identityBox.classList.add("weakCipher");
}
} else if (this._isCertErrorPage) {
@@ -830,8 +858,10 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
// Network errors and blocked pages get a more neutral icon
this._identityBox.className = "unknownIdentity";
} else if (this._isPotentiallyTrustworthy) {
- // This is a local resource (and shouldn't be marked insecure).
- this._identityBox.className = "localResource";
+ // This is a local resource or an onion site (and shouldn't be marked insecure).
+ this._identityBox.className = this._uriIsOnionHost
+ ? "onionUnknownIdentity"
+ : "localResource";
} else {
// This is an insecure connection.
let warnOnInsecure =
@@ -855,7 +885,10 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
}
if (this._isCertUserOverridden) {
- this._identityBox.classList.add("certUserOverridden");
+ const uriIsOnionHost = this._uriIsOnionHost;
+ this._identityBox.classList.add(
+ uriIsOnionHost ? "onionCertUserOverridden" : "certUserOverridden"
+ );
// Cert is trusted because of a security exception, verifier is a special string.
tooltip = gNavigatorBundle.getString(
"identity.identified.verified_by_you"
diff --git a/browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js b/browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js
index 1222c8b0ec35d..a5d354208d795 100644
--- a/browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js
+++ b/browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ ChromeUtils.defineModuleGetter(
"PluralForm",
"resource://gre/modules/PluralForm.jsm"
);
+XPCOMUtils.defineLazyGetter(this, "gTorButtonBundle", function() {
+ return Services.strings.createBundle(
+ "chrome://torbutton/locale/torbutton.properties"
+ );
+});
var security = {
async init(uri, windowInfo) {
@@ -60,6 +65,11 @@ var security = {
(Ci.nsIWebProgressListener.STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT |
Ci.nsIWebProgressListener.STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT);
var isEV = ui.state & Ci.nsIWebProgressListener.STATE_IDENTITY_EV_TOPLEVEL;
+ var isOnion = false;
+ const hostName = this.windowInfo.hostName;
+ if (hostName && hostName.endsWith(".onion")) {
+ isOnion = true;
+ }
let retval = {
cAName: "",
@@ -69,6 +79,7 @@ var security = {
isBroken,
isMixed,
isEV,
+ isOnion,
cert: null,
certificateTransparency: null,
};
@@ -107,6 +118,7 @@ var security = {
isBroken,
isMixed,
isEV,
+ isOnion,
cert,
certChain: certChainArray,
certificateTransparency: undefined,
@@ -348,13 +360,31 @@ async function securityOnLoad(uri, windowInfo) {
}
msg2 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_None2");
} else if (info.encryptionStrength > 0) {
- hdr = pkiBundle.getFormattedString(
- "pageInfo_EncryptionWithBitsAndProtocol",
- [info.encryptionAlgorithm, info.encryptionStrength + "", info.version]
- );
+ if (!info.isOnion) {
+ hdr = pkiBundle.getFormattedString(
+ "pageInfo_EncryptionWithBitsAndProtocol",
+ [info.encryptionAlgorithm, info.encryptionStrength + "", info.version]
+ );
+ } else {
+ try {
+ hdr = gTorButtonBundle.formatStringFromName(
+ "pageInfo_OnionEncryptionWithBitsAndProtocol",
+ [info.encryptionAlgorithm, info.encryptionStrength + "", info.version]
+ );
+ } catch (err) {
+ hdr =
+ "Connection Encrypted (Onion Service, " +
+ info.encryptionAlgorithm +
+ ", " +
+ info.encryptionStrength +
+ " bit keys, " +
+ info.version +
+ ")";
+ }
+ }
msg1 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_Encrypted1");
msg2 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_Encrypted2");
- } else {
+ } else if (!info.isOnion) {
hdr = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_NoEncryption");
if (windowInfo.hostName != null) {
msg1 = pkiBundle.getFormattedString("pageInfo_Privacy_None1", [
@@ -364,6 +394,15 @@ async function securityOnLoad(uri, windowInfo) {
msg1 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_None4");
}
msg2 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_None2");
+ } else {
+ try {
+ hdr = gTorButtonBundle.GetStringFromName("pageInfo_OnionEncryption");
+ } catch (err) {
+ hdr = "Connection Encrypted (Onion Service)";
+ }
+
+ msg1 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_Encrypted1");
+ msg2 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_Encrypted2");
}
setText("security-technical-shortform", hdr);
setText("security-technical-longform1", msg1);
diff --git a/browser/themes/shared/identity-block/identity-block.css b/browser/themes/shared/identity-block/identity-block.css
index 63c07d21a453f..7314a6570fb89 100644
--- a/browser/themes/shared/identity-block/identity-block.css
+++ b/browser/themes/shared/identity-block/identity-block.css
@@ -193,6 +193,25 @@
list-style-image: url(chrome://global/skin/icons/security-broken.svg);
}
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionUnknownIdentity #identity-icon,
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionVerifiedDomain #identity-icon,
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionMixedActiveBlocked #identity-icon {
+ list-style-image: url(chrome://browser/skin/onion.svg);
+ visibility: visible;
+}
+
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionMixedDisplayContent #identity-icon,
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionMixedDisplayContentLoadedActiveBlocked #identity-icon,
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionCertUserOverridden #identity-icon {
+ list-style-image: url(chrome://browser/skin/onion-warning.svg);
+ visibility: visible;
+}
+
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionMixedActiveContent #identity-icon {
+ list-style-image: url(chrome://browser/skin/onion-slash.svg);
+ visibility: visible;
+}
+
#permissions-granted-icon {
list-style-image: url(chrome://browser/skin/permissions.svg);
}
diff --git a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
index 0562245205a33..0dced75b718af 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
+++ b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
@@ -9451,6 +9451,25 @@ bool nsContentUtils::ComputeIsSecureContext(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
return principal->GetIsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy();
}
+/* static */ bool nsContentUtils::DocumentHasOnionURI(Document* aDocument) {
+ if (!aDocument) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ nsIURI* uri = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
+ if (!uri) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ nsAutoCString host;
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(uri->GetHost(host))) {
+ bool hasOnionURI = StringEndsWith(host, ".onion"_ns);
+ return hasOnionURI;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/* static */
void nsContentUtils::TryToUpgradeElement(Element* aElement) {
NodeInfo* nodeInfo = aElement->NodeInfo();
diff --git a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.h b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.h
index 739e8ca23c858..12d1c3b998b88 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.h
+++ b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.h
@@ -3014,6 +3014,11 @@ class nsContentUtils {
*/
static bool HttpsStateIsModern(Document* aDocument);
+ /**
+ * Returns true of the document's URI is a .onion
+ */
+ static bool DocumentHasOnionURI(Document* aDocument);
+
/**
* Returns true if the channel is for top-level window and is over secure
* context.
diff --git a/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowOuter.cpp b/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowOuter.cpp
index 03b90e6098d85..6697ae5ee2ab2 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowOuter.cpp
+++ b/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowOuter.cpp
@@ -1882,7 +1882,8 @@ bool nsGlobalWindowOuter::ComputeIsSecureContext(Document* aDocument,
return false;
}
- if (nsContentUtils::HttpsStateIsModern(aDocument)) {
+ if (nsContentUtils::HttpsStateIsModern(aDocument) ||
+ nsContentUtils::DocumentHasOnionURI(aDocument)) {
return true;
}
diff --git a/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp b/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp
index 3413442f11374..7d6a028d676f5 100644
--- a/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp
+++ b/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include "mozilla/net/CookieJarSettings.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalChild.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
#include "nsGlobalWindowInner.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
@@ -133,7 +134,8 @@ WindowGlobalInit WindowGlobalActor::WindowInitializer(
// Init Mixed Content Fields
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerDocURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(doc->GetDocumentURI());
- fields.mIsSecure = innerDocURI && innerDocURI->SchemeIs("https");
+ fields.mIsSecure = innerDocURI && (innerDocURI->SchemeIs("https") ||
+ nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(innerDocURI));
nsCOMPtr<nsITransportSecurityInfo> securityInfo;
if (nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = doc->GetChannel()) {
diff --git a/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp b/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp
index f209705183cbc..f9ce500f18e2f 100644
--- a/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp
+++ b/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
#include "nsIURIMutator.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+
using namespace mozilla::ipc;
using namespace mozilla::dom::ipc;
@@ -228,7 +230,9 @@ void WindowGlobalChild::OnNewDocument(Document* aDocument) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerDocURI =
NS_GetInnermostURI(aDocument->GetDocumentURI());
if (innerDocURI) {
- txn.SetIsSecure(innerDocURI->SchemeIs("https"));
+ txn.SetIsSecure(
+ innerDocURI->SchemeIs("https") ||
+ nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(innerDocURI));
}
MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(mDocumentPrincipal->GetIsLocalIpAddress() ==
diff --git a/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp b/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
index e4352e3cb43b8..2a7d878a2fcf5 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
@@ -666,8 +666,8 @@ nsresult nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect,
return NS_OK;
}
- // Check the parent scheme. If it is not an HTTPS page then mixed content
- // restrictions do not apply.
+ // Check the parent scheme. If it is not an HTTPS or .onion page then mixed
+ // content restrictions do not apply.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerRequestingLocation =
NS_GetInnermostURI(requestingLocation);
if (!innerRequestingLocation) {
@@ -682,6 +682,17 @@ nsresult nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect,
bool parentIsHttps = innerRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("https");
if (!parentIsHttps) {
+ bool parentIsOnion = IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(innerRequestingLocation);
+ if (!parentIsOnion) {
+ *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ bool isHttpScheme = innerContentLocation->SchemeIs("http");
+ // .onion URLs are encrypted and authenticated. Don't treat them as mixed
+ // content if potentially trustworthy (i.e. whitelisted).
+ if (isHttpScheme && IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(innerContentLocation)) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" -> decision: Request will be allowed because the requesting "
@@ -708,7 +719,6 @@ nsresult nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect,
return NS_OK;
}
- bool isHttpScheme = innerContentLocation->SchemeIs("http");
if (isHttpScheme && IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(innerContentLocation)) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
diff --git a/mobile/android/modules/geckoview/GeckoViewProgress.jsm b/mobile/android/modules/geckoview/GeckoViewProgress.jsm
index d121ce850f7f6..e054bc6bd7090 100644
--- a/mobile/android/modules/geckoview/GeckoViewProgress.jsm
+++ b/mobile/android/modules/geckoview/GeckoViewProgress.jsm
@@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ var IdentityHandler = {
result.host = uri.host;
}
+ if (!aBrowser.securityUI.secInfo) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
const cert = aBrowser.securityUI.secInfo.serverCert;
result.certificate = aBrowser.securityUI.secInfo.serverCert.getBase64DERString();
diff --git a/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp b/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp
index b6ee9f699ea84..2ad18700bd441 100644
--- a/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp
+++ b/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp
@@ -907,6 +907,9 @@ Result CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
+
+ bool errOnionWithSelfSignedCert = false;
+
bool isBuiltChainRootBuiltInRootLocal;
rv = VerifyCert(peerCertBytes, certificateUsageSSLServer, time, pinarg,
PromiseFlatCString(hostname).get(), builtChain, flags,
@@ -926,9 +929,16 @@ Result CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(
CertIsSelfSigned(peerBackCert, pinarg)) {
// In this case we didn't find any issuer for the certificate and the
// certificate is self-signed.
- return Result::ERROR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+ if (StringEndsWith(hostname, ".onion"_ns)) {
+ // Self signed cert over onion is deemed secure, the hidden service provides authentication.
+ // We defer returning this error and keep processing to determine if there are other legitimate
+ // certificate errors (such as expired, wrong domain) that we would like to surface to the user
+ errOnionWithSelfSignedCert = true;
+ } else {
+ return Result::ERROR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+ }
}
- if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
+ if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER && !errOnionWithSelfSignedCert) {
// In this case we didn't get any valid path for the cert. Let's see if
// the issuer is the same as the issuer for our canary probe. If yes, this
// connection is connecting via a misconfigured proxy.
@@ -952,7 +962,9 @@ Result CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(
return Result::ERROR_MITM_DETECTED;
}
}
- return rv;
+ if (!errOnionWithSelfSignedCert) {
+ return rv;
+ }
}
if (dcInfo) {
@@ -1002,7 +1014,9 @@ Result CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(
if (isBuiltChainRootBuiltInRoot) {
*isBuiltChainRootBuiltInRoot = isBuiltChainRootBuiltInRootLocal;
}
-
+ if (errOnionWithSelfSignedCert) {
+ return Result::ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+ }
return Success;
}
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp
index 52628799176c8..2df79a3bc11a0 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp
@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ SECStatus DetermineCertOverrideErrors(const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert>& cert,
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_MITM_DETECTED:
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_V1_CERT_USED_AS_CA: {
collectedErrors = nsICertOverrideService::ERROR_UNTRUSTED;
errorCodeTrust = defaultErrorCodeToReport;
@@ -830,6 +831,17 @@ PRErrorCode AuthCertificateParseResults(
gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[0x%" PRIx64 "] Certificate error was not overridden\n", aPtrForLog));
+ // If Onion with self signed cert we want to prioritize any other error
+ if (errorCodeTrust == MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) {
+ if (errorCodeMismatch) {
+ return errorCodeMismatch;
+ } else if (errorCodeTime) {
+ return errorCodeTime;
+ } else {
+ return MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+ }
+ }
+
// pick the error code to report by priority
return errorCodeTrust ? errorCodeTrust
: errorCodeMismatch ? errorCodeMismatch
@@ -1257,7 +1269,7 @@ SSLServerCertVerificationResult::Run() {
// Certificate validation failed; store the peer certificate chain on
// infoObject so it can be used for error reporting.
mInfoObject->SetFailedCertChain(std::move(mPeerCertChain));
- if (mCollectedErrors != 0) {
+ if (mCollectedErrors != 0 && mFinalError != MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) {
mInfoObject->SetStatusErrorBits(cert, mCollectedErrors);
}
}
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
index 2c36893324ff0..d79237478cdd1 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
@@ -420,7 +420,11 @@ void nsNSSSocketInfo::SetCertVerificationResult(PRErrorCode errorCode) {
"Invalid state transition to cert_verification_finished");
if (mFd) {
- SECStatus rv = SSL_AuthCertificateComplete(mFd, errorCode);
+ PRErrorCode passCode = errorCode;
+ if (errorCode == MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) {
+ passCode = 0;
+ }
+ SECStatus rv = SSL_AuthCertificateComplete(mFd, passCode);
// Only replace errorCode if there was originally no error
if (rv != SECSuccess && errorCode == 0) {
errorCode = PR_GetError();
@@ -431,12 +435,15 @@ void nsNSSSocketInfo::SetCertVerificationResult(PRErrorCode errorCode) {
}
}
- if (errorCode) {
+ if (errorCode &&
+ errorCode != MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) {
mFailedVerification = true;
SetCanceled(errorCode);
}
- if (mPlaintextBytesRead && !errorCode) {
+ if (mPlaintextBytesRead &&
+ (!errorCode ||
+ errorCode == MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT)) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_BYTES_BEFORE_CERT_CALLBACK,
AssertedCast<uint32_t>(mPlaintextBytesRead));
}
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp
index b4de1a331ffcf..f1ce395828547 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsDocShell.h"
@@ -85,6 +86,17 @@ void nsSecureBrowserUI::RecomputeSecurityFlags() {
}
}
}
+
+ // any protocol routed over tor is secure
+ if (!(mState & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE)) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerDocURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(win->GetDocumentURI());
+ if (innerDocURI &&
+ nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(innerDocURI)) {
+ MOZ_LOG(gSecureBrowserUILog, LogLevel::Debug, (" is onion"));
+ mState = (mState & ~nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_INSECURE) |
+ nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE;
+ }
+ }
}
// Add upgraded-state flags when request has been
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/mozpkix/include/pkix/Result.h b/security/nss/lib/mozpkix/include/pkix/Result.h
index 29461dc1a510b..b2ad3a383ceb3 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/mozpkix/include/pkix/Result.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/mozpkix/include/pkix/Result.h
@@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ static const unsigned int FATAL_ERROR_FLAG = 0x800;
SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) \
MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP(FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, FATAL_ERROR_FLAG | 4, \
SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY) \
+ MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP(ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, 155, \
+ MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) \
/* nothing here */
enum class Result {
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/mozpkix/include/pkix/pkixnss.h b/security/nss/lib/mozpkix/include/pkix/pkixnss.h
index c1050c6497a44..75a7c4e9c0fb6 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/mozpkix/include/pkix/pkixnss.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/mozpkix/include/pkix/pkixnss.h
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ enum ErrorCode {
MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ADDITIONAL_POLICY_CONSTRAINT_FAILED = ERROR_BASE + 13,
MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT = ERROR_BASE + 14,
MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_MITM_DETECTED = ERROR_BASE + 15,
+ MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ONION_WITH_SELF_SIGNED_CERT = ERROR_BASE + 100,
END_OF_LIST
};
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