[tbb-bugs] #30570 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement per-site security settings support
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Jan 15 22:13:13 UTC 2020
#30570: Implement per-site security settings support
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Reporter: gk | Owner:
| pospeselr
Type: enhancement | Status:
| assigned
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: ux-team, tbb-9.5, | Actual Points:
TorBrowserTeam202001 |
Parent ID: #25658 | Points: 10
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
| Sponsor9
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Comment (by pospeselr):
So our current UX design calls for a similar flow to how webcam or
location permissions work, but applied to 1st party/top document JS, 3rd
party/subresource JS, and a nebulous 'Active Content' category which would
include everything else: webgl, object, media, and fonts (we may split
these up later).
----
For the backend, I *think* that we would need a flag for each meta-
capability that allows it to cascade to subresources. Or instead of each
meta-capability being a flag that indicates enabled or disabled, it
becomes an enum: enabled, disabled, and enabled+cascade. This way on a
per-site basis we could allow top level JS and subresource JS, but
disallow subresource webgl/fonts/etc for example (rather than having
cascading happen *everywhere* as with a global setting, or for
*everything* as with an additional meta-capability).
We also will need some sort of mechanism for Tor Browser to get a
notification, or have a callback called, etc, whenever NoScript blocks a
resource via a meta-capability so that we can potentially throw up UI to
allow the user to enable the blocked capability for that site.
And finally, we would need a way to send NoScript new site settings once
users have interacted with the above UI. We *could* just send over an
entire settings struct like we already do on startup and when the security
slider level changes, but I am concerned that could get laggy as the
number of per-site settings grows (but we can always worry about that
later if it becomes a problem).
What do you think?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30570#comment:18>
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