[tbb-bugs] #31740 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review RemoteSettings usages in esr68
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Oct 17 11:38:53 UTC 2019
#31740: Review RemoteSettings usages in esr68
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: acat | Owner: tbb-
| team
Type: defect | Status: closed
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution: fixed
Keywords: ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha, | Actual Points:
TorBrowserTeam201910R |
Parent ID: | Points: 0.5
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by gk):
* status: needs_review => closed
* resolution: => fixed
Comment:
Replying to [comment:7 acat]:
Thanks for the detailed analysis, really appreciated!
> To give an idea about what these remote-settings requests look like.
Periodically, or responding to some events (e.g. creating a
`RemoteSettings(...)` client for a new collection), there will be a GET
request to
`https://firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com/v1/buckets/monitor/collections/changes/records`,
used to obtain a list of available "collections" and metadata about them
(https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
esr68/rev/4fc15df791ad4d3ceaf1a958af2bfc1252433ca8/services/settings/Utils.jsm#57).
Each entry looks like:
>
> {{{
> id: 8da7db1e-dffb-18c9-2efe-0e9d7459a0f4
> last_modified: 1571184016986
> bucket: main
> collection: normandy-recipes
> host: firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com
> }}}
>
> For each collection (distinct `RemoteSettings("...")` call), depending
on the corresponding `last_modified` value returned in the previous
request another request might be performed to retrieve the records of that
collection (possibly only the ones that changed since some timestamp). For
example, for `onecrl` collection
`https://firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com/v1/buckets/security-
state/collections/onecrl?_expected=1568310941289` would be fetched (with
possibly different parameters).
>
> One concern is that the different parameters (etag, timestamps...) might
be leaking enough info about the user state that it allows linking
together requests done over time as belonging to the same user. In
principle, the request parameters depend on the values returned in
previous responses, and these seem not to change very often. I did not do
a deep analysis, but I feel like we would not lose too much by doing the
same requests without parameters (as if there was no previous state in the
browser). I don't see the responses being so big, nor the requests done so
often. But this would probably require a bit more time to make sure the
changes are not breaking the `RemoteSettings` functionality. Perhaps on a
different ticket?
Sounds good, please file one.
> For now, I think we can disable the `RemoteSettings("...")` calls that
we do not need, if only for sparing some unnecessary requests. The
currently active `RemoteSettings` instances are:
>
> * `toolkit/components/search/SearchService.jsm` (hijack-blocklists)
> * I think we don't want this one, it allows mozilla to blacklist
search extensions.
> * `browser/components/preferences/browserLanguages.js` (language-
dictionaries):
> * I think we need this one if we allow changing language via
`about:preferences`.
> * `netwerk/url-classifier/UrlClassifierSkipListService.jsm` (url-
classifier-skip-urls):
> * We don't need this one until we enable enhanced tracking protection
(content blocking).
> * `services/common/blocklist-clients.js` (onecrl, pins):
> * OneCRl and certificate pinning blocklist? I think we want to have
these.
>
> Note that the previously mentioned `RemoteSettings` instances in
`toolkit/mozapps/extensions/Blocklist.jsm` are actually currently disabled
because of `extensions.blocklist.useXML = true`, see
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16931#comment:8.
>
> So here is a patch disabling `hijack-blocklists` and `url-classifier-
skip-urls`: https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commit/31740. If
it's ok to disable the latter, we could update #30939, as we will need to
reenable if we decide to enable Firefox Enhanced Tracking Protection.
Looks good, thanks! I cherry-picked the commit to `tor-
browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-3` (commit
e1e1f70187dc106628e8e8c58ecbe23976b31131). Making a note on #30939 would
be good. Maybe we don't want to use that protocol when working on ETP but
we should have it on our radar that we disabled it.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31740#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tbb-bugs
mailing list