[tbb-bugs] #28536 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SuperCookie Built Into TLS 1.2 and 1.3
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Nov 21 12:09:45 UTC 2018
#28536: SuperCookie Built Into TLS 1.2 and 1.3
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Reporter: heyjoe | Owner: tbb-team
Type: defect | Status: closed
Priority: Very High | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution: not a bug
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by boklm):
* status: reopened => closed
* resolution: => not a bug
Comment:
Replying to [comment:3 heyjoe]:
> I don't think this has anything to do with privacy.firstparty.isolate in
particular.
>
> From what I read in the article the essential issue is that the user can
be tracked across multiple IP addresses (and obviously identities) due to
the way TLS works - they storage of keys. In that sense - what does first
party mean? It is not an issue with primary and external domains.
Tracking a user inside a single browser session/website visit is possible
in multiple ways. What we want avoid is cross-site tracking, and cross-
sessions tracking (when the user creates a new session by clicking on new-
identity or restarting the browser).
>
> You say:
>
> > We leave the other preferences as-is
>
> but TBB doesn't have security.ssl.disable_session_identifiers which the
article recommends. Considering that
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/ says
>
> > We disable TLS Session Tickets and SSL Session IDs by setting
security.ssl.disable_session_identifiers to true."
>
> this is actually a bug as such setting is simply missing in
about:config.
This is because this doc has not yet been updated for the 8.0 release
(this will be done with ticket #25021).
This pref was set to true in the past: #4099
With the 8.0 release, it has been changed to false, after confirming that
TLS session resumption/ID are isolated to the URL bar domain, so not a
cross-site tracking risk: #17252
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28536#comment:5>
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