[tbb-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Jul 20 08:37:10 UTC 2017
#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: tbb-
| team
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Blocker | Resolution:
Keywords: ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb- | Actual Points:
usability, ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201707, |
GeorgKoppen201707 |
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by gk):
Okay, just as an update on where we are with this issue. I have a
workaround for the password part which I will post for review in a child
ticket. While working on this I thought about good ways of upstreaming
this patch and generally of a way to get .onion URLs not treated as non-
secure anymore.
The tricky thing is that there is a spec behind defining what secure
contexts are (see: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/) and,
looking at the algorithm defining "secure context", getting .onion domains
treated as such is not going to fly without a spec change. I'd assume a
lot of the stakeholders would show quite some resistance to that (probably
with some good reasons).
But we might be able to bypass that hassle by using other means provided
in that spec, in particular treating .onions as potentially trustworthy
origins (https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-
trustworthy):
{{{
A potentially trustworthy origin is one which a user agent can generally
trust as delivering data securely.
This algorithms considers certain hosts, scheme, and origins as
potentially trustworthy, even though they might not be authenticated and
encrypted in the traditional sense.
}}}
Mozilla folks indicated they would be amenable to this idea, which is very
exciting. The upstream bug for that is
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1382359. Not sure if I get to
rewriting my patches according to that idea before the next Tor Browser
release. But the plan is to have this upstream bug fixed for esr59 at
least.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21321#comment:45>
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