[ooni-talk] [Report] Tanzania: Surge in online LGBTIQ censorship and other targeted blocks

[Maria Xynou]

Hello,

Today OONI published a new research report: "*Tanzania: Surge in online
LGBTIQ censorship and other targeted blocks*".

Read the report here:
https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/

As part of this report, we analyzed OONI data collected from Tanzania over
the last year, between 1st January 2023 to 31st January 2024.

Our analysis of OONI data collected from Tanzania shows:

1) *Blocking of many LGBTIQ websites*, including:
* LGBTIQ social networks (such as Grindr)
* LGBTIQ rights sites (such as OutRight International and ILGA)
* LGBTIQ news and culture sites (such as Queerty)
* LGBTIQ suicide prevention site (The Trevor Project)

2) *Blocking of online dating websites* (such as Tinder and OKCupid)

3) *Blocking of specific websites that defend human rights through grants
and petitions* (Change.org, Global Fund for Women, GlobalGiving, Open
Society Foundations)

4) *Blocking of specific social networking sites* (Clubhouse and 4chan)

5) *Blocking of a specific VPN* (ProtonVPN)

Our analysis reveals the *extensive blocking of LGBTIQ sites*, which
correlates with the escalating discrimination and crackdown on LGBTIQ
communities in Tanzania in recent years.

Many other blocks identified as part of this study appear to be targeted,
as they involve very specific websites, while other sites from the same
categories (e.g. social media, human rights) were found accessible. For
example, access to the Global Fund for Women website was found blocked in
Tanzania, while Amnesty International's website was found accessible.

Meanwhile, Tanzania recently started requiring users to report their use of
VPNs. Out of tested VPNs, we only found *ProtonVPN blocked* in Tanzania
during the analysis period.

We encourage researchers to explore whether the new VPN reporting
requirement results in reduced VPN use in Tanzania, as well as its impact
on LGBTIQ communities and other human rights movements in Tanzania.

Overall, the results of our analysis show that most ISPs in Tanzania appear
to implement blocks by means of *TLS interference*, specifically by timing
out the session after the ClientHello message during the TLS handshake. As
the timing of the blocks and the types of URLs blocked are (mostly)
consistent across (tested) networks, ISPs in Tanzania likely implement
blocks in a coordinated manner (possibly through the use of Deep Packet
Inspection technology).

Learn more through our report:
https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/

We thank OONI Probe (https://ooni.org/install/) users in Tanzania for
contributing measurements, supporting this study.

You can monitor internet censorship in Tanzania (and around the world)
through real-time OONI data:
https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2024-03-12&until=2024-04-12&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity

Thanks,

Maria.
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