[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Jan 13 21:41:07 UTC 2015
===========================================================================
==== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2015/2 ====
===========================================================================
version 3
Author: harmony
Date: 2015-01-13T20:51:53+00:00
newsbomb
--- version 2
+++ version 3
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
''80th issue of Tor Weekly News. Covering what's happening from January 6th, 2015 to January 13th, 2015. To be released on January 14th, 2015.''
-'''Editor:'''
+'''Editor:''' Harmony
'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — January 14th, 2015
@@ -10,80 +10,157 @@
========================================================================
Welcome to the second issue in 2015 of Tor Weekly News, the weekly
-newsletter that covers what’s happening in the XXX Tor community.
+newsletter that covers what’s happening in the Tor community.
-Feature XXX
------------
+What to do if meek gets blocked
+-------------------------------
-Feature 1 with cited source [XXX]
+Regular readers of Tor Weekly News will be familiar with meek [XXX], the
+pluggable transport developed by David Fifield. Where most existing
+transports work by connecting clients to “bridge” relays that are
+difficult for the adversary to discover (or identify as relays), meek
+makes all of a client’s Tor traffic appear as though it is destined for
+a domain that is “too big to block” — in other words, web platforms so
+popular that a censor cannot prevent access to them without disrupting
+lots of unrelated Internet activity in its sphere of control — when in
+fact the traffic is sent to meek servers running on those platforms,
+which in turn relays it into the regular Tor network. Google, Amazon,
+and Microsoft are some of the services whose domain names currently work
+as disguises for meek.
- [XXX]:
+Unfortunately, that doesn’t mean meek is unblockable. As David
+wrote [XXX] to the tor-talk mailing list, “that’s the wrong way to think
+about the problem”. “It is designed to be difficult and expensive to
+block […] but suppose a censor makes that call, and blocks
+Google/Amazon/whatever. What then?”
-Monthly status reports for XXX month 2015
------------------------------------------
+Two easy solutions are selecting a different backend (meek-amazon
+instead of meek-google, for example) or using a different DNS server:
+“The most common way to block a domain name is by DNS poisoning; i.e.,
+the IP address behind the name is accessible, but the local DNS server
+gives you a false address. Try a public DNS server such as 8.8.8.8. But
+if that works, be aware that it’s probably only a temporary fix, as
+censors have historically figured out the alternate-DNS trick pretty
+fast.”
-The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
-month of XXX has begun. XXX released his report first [XXX], followed
-by reports from name 2 [XXX], name 3 [XXX], and name 4 [XXX].
+“What you really want to do”, David suggested, “if the easy things don’t
+work, is choose a different front domain.” Please see David’s message
+for a fuller explanation of the difference between the backend and the
+“front domain”, and a guide to configuring new domains — as well as one
+to setting up your own meek web app, if all else fails.
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
+ [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-January/036410.html
Miscellaneous news
------------------
-Item 1 with cited source [XXX].
+sycamoreone announced [XXX] orc, a Go library that implements parts of
+Tor’s control protocol. “I do have some ideas for a higher-level
+interface, but no fixed plan yet. The next step will probably be to add
+net/http-like handlerFuncs to handle (asynchronous) replies from the
+onion router.”
-Item 2 with cited source [XXX].
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-January/036425.html
-Item 3 with cited source [XXX].
+taxakis linked [XXX] to “Post-Quantum Secure Onion Routing” [XXX] by
+Satrajit Ghosh and Aniket Kate, a new paper proposing a successor to the
+currently-used ntor handshake protocol that would be “resilient against
+quantum attacks, but also at the same time allow OR nodes to use the
+current DH public keys, and consequently require no modification to the
+current Tor public key infrastructure.” Nick Mathewson wondered [XXX]
+whether “anybody around here has the cryptographic background to comment
+on the PQ part of their scheme?”, and compared it to Yawning Angel’s
+experimental “basket” protocol [XXX].
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-January/036420.html
+ [XXX]: http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/008
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-January/036429.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007977.html
-Tor help desk roundup
----------------------
+Nick also sent out a draft of proposal 240 [XXX], describing “a simple
+way for directory authorities to perform signing key revocation”.
-Summary of some questions sent to the Tor help desk.
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-January/008115.html
-News from Tor StackExchange
----------------------------
+Daniel Forster asked [XXX] for advice on proposed research into
+splitting traffic over multiple entry guards in combination with traffic
+padding: “Is the approach heading in a not so great direction w.r.t.
+the Tor Project’s ‘only one entry node’ decision?”
-Text with cited source [XXX].
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-January/008099.html
- [XXX]:
+Karsten Loesing submitted his status report for December [XXX], and
+George Kadianakis sent out the report for SponsorR [XXX].
-Easy development tasks to get involved with
--------------------------------------------
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2015-January/000744.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2015-January/000745.html
-Text with cited source [XXX].
+“After CCC I have a list of people that I have given raspberry pi’s with
+ooniprobe, and I would like to start coordinating with them via a
+mailing list”, wrote Arturo Filastò [XXX], and the result is the
+ooni-operators mailing list [XXX]. If you regularly run ooniprobe, or
+want to start, be sure to sign up!
- [XXX]:
+ [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/14140
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/ooni-operators
-This week in Tor history
-------------------------
+Aleksejs Popovs shared with the ooni-dev mailing list [XXX] the results
+of an OONI investigation into Latvian internet censorship, conducted
+using ooniprobe.
-Text with cited source [XXX].
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/ooni-dev/2015-January/000220.html
- [XXX]:
+Dan O’Huiginn started a conversation [XXX] about how to ensure users are
+informed of the possible consequences of running OONI tests.
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/ooni-dev/2015-January/000208.html
+
+Thanks to John Knoll [XXX] and Monsieur Tino [XXX] for running mirrors
+of the Tor Project’s website and software archive!
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-mirrors/2015-January/000828.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-mirrors/2015-January/000835.html
+
+“How do we prevent a website mirror admin from tampering with the served
+files?”, wondered Frédéric Cornu [XXX]. Christian Krbusek
+clarified [XXX] that “in fact, you can’t prevent that, but you are also
+mirroring the signature files. So anybody downloading from any mirror
+— even the original host — should verify the downloads”. Andrew Lewman
+added [XXX] that “the binaries are signed by well-known keys of tor
+packagers and developers. The mirror update script randomly selects a
+binary and verifies it each time it runs. If the binaries don't match,
+the mirror is removed from the public list.”
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-mirrors/2015-January/000844.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-mirrors/2015-January/000845.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-mirrors/2015-January/000848.html
Upcoming events
---------------
-Jul XX-XX | Event XXX brief description
- | Event City, Event Country
- | Event website URL
- |
-Jul XX-XX | Event XXX brief description
- | Event City, Event Country
- | Event website URL
+ Jan 14 13:30 UTC | little-t tor development meeting
+ | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
+ |
+ Jan 16 19:30 UTC | Tails/Jessie progress meeting
+ | #tails-dev, irc.oftc.net
+ | https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2014-December/007696.html
+ |
+ Jan 19 18:00 UTC | Tor Browser online meeting
+ | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
+ |
+ Jan 19 18:00 UTC | OONI development meeting
+ | #ooni, irc.oftc.net
+ |
+ Jan 20 18:00 UTC | little-t tor patch workshop
+ | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
+ |
+ Jan 22 17:30 JST | Jacob @ Free Software Initiative of Japan
+ | Tokyo, Japan
+ | http://www.fsij.org/monthly-meetings/2015/Jan.html
-This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by XXX, XXX, and
-XXX.
+This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Harmony.
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
--
Your friendly TWN monitoring script
In case of malfunction, please reach out for lunar at torproject.org
or for the worst cases, tell weasel at torproject.org to kill me.
More information about the news-team
mailing list