[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Mar 18 12:40:25 UTC 2014
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/11 ===
===========================================================================
version 33
Author: karsten
Date: 2014-03-18T12:08:08+00:00
Minor fixes.
--- version 32
+++ version 33
@@ -99,15 +99,15 @@
Last October, Roger Dingledine called for research on improving Tor's
anonymity by changing guard parameters [22]. One of these parameters is
-the number of guard nodes used simultenously by a Tor client.
+the number of guard nodes used simultaneously by a Tor client.
Following up on the paper written by Tariq Elahi et al. [23], Roger's
-blog post, and recent discussions during the winter dev. meeting,
+blog post, and recent discussions during the winter dev. meeting,
George Kadianakis made a detailed analysis of the implications of
switching to a single guard node [24]. He studied the performance
implications of switching to a single guard, the performance
implications of raising the minimum guard bandwidth for both clients and
-the overall network, and the change would affect the overall anonymity
+the overall network, and how the change would affect the overall anonymity
and fingerprintability of Tor users.
Jumping to conclusions: “It seems that the performance implications of
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
might involve guard node buckets [25]”.
For a better understanding, be sure to look at George's work which
-includes graphs and proper explainations.
+includes graphs and proper explanations.
[22]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters
[23]: http://freehaven.net/~arma/cogs-wpes.pdf
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
release fixes an important bug [27] “where scramblesuit would basically
reject clients if they try to connect a second time after a short amount
of time has passed.” Bridge operators are strongly advised to upgrade
-from source [28], pip [29] or the upcoming Debian packages.
+from source [28], pip [29], or the upcoming Debian packages.
[26]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-March/004074.html
[27]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11100
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@
Relay and bridge operators might be interested in Ramo's first
release [35] of a Tor plugin for Nagios [36]. It can currently check for
a page fetch through the SOCKS proxy port, the hibernation state, the
-current bandwidth, ORPort reachability, DirPort reachability and the
+current bandwidth, ORPort reachability, DirPort reachability, and the
bytes remaining until hibernation.
[35]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-March/004062.html
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
The help desk has seen an increase in Russian language support requests
amidst news that the Russian Federation began censoring a number of
websites. Unfortunately, the help desk is not able to provide support in
-Russian for now. Changes in the number of Tor users by country can be
+Russian for now. Changes in the number of Tor users by country can be
observed on our metrics page [41].
[41]: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html
version 32
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-03-18T11:38:04+00:00
FREEZE
--- version 31
+++ version 32
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
''37th issue of Tor Weekly News. Covering what's happening from March 11th, 2014 to March 18th, 2014. To be released on March 19th, 2014.''
'''Editor:''' Lunar
+
+'''Status:''' Frozen! Only language and technical fixes accepted. New items should go in [wiki:TorWeeklyNews/2014/12 next week's edition]. Expected publication time: 2014-03-19 12:00 UTC.
'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — March 19th, 2014
@@ -15,11 +17,11 @@
Accessing the Tor network from China
------------------------------------
-In a new blog post “How to read our China usage graphs”, Roger
+In a new blog post “How to read our China usage graphs” [1], Roger
Dingledine looks at the current situation of how Tor is able to
-circumvent censorship on Chinese Internet accesses. Indeed, if
-one only looks at the current bridge users graph [XXX], one
-might believe that Tor is not a solution for users in China.
+circumvent censorship on Chinese Internet accesses. Indeed, if one only
+looks at the current bridge users graph [2], one might believe that Tor
+is not a solution for users in China.
“The correct interpretation of the graph is ‘obfs3 bridges have not been
deployed enough to keep up with the demand in China’. So it isn't that
@@ -27,158 +29,160 @@
obfs3 bridges or ScrambleSuit bridges, which are the latest steps in the
arms race” writes Roger.
-The upcoming version — currently in QA phase [XXX] — of the Tor Browser
-will include support for the pluggable transports [XXX] obfs3 [XXX],
-FTE [XXX] and Flashproxy [XXX]. Having these transports ready to be
-used in a couple of clicks should help Chinese users.
-
-The “obfs3” protocol is still vulnerable to active probing attacks.
-The deployment of its replacement, ScrambleSuit [XXX], is on-going.
-As Roger highlighted, “we need to get more addresses”. Several ways
-have been thoughts in the past [XXX], but until there is more
-cooperation from ISP and network operators, your can make a difference
-by running a bridge [XXX] if you can!
+The upcoming version — currently in QA phase [3] — of the Tor Browser
+will include support for the pluggable transports [4] obfs3 [5], FTE [6]
+and Flashproxy [7]. Having these transports ready to be used in a couple
+of clicks should help Chinese users.
+
+The “obfs3” protocol is still vulnerable to active probing attacks. The
+deployment of its replacement, ScrambleSuit [8], is on-going. As Roger
+highlighted, “we need to get more addresses”. Several ways have been
+thoughts in the past [9], but until there is more cooperation from ISP
+and network operators, your can make a difference by running a
+bridge [10] if you can!
On another front, work is currently on-going on the bridge
-distributor [XXX] to improve how censored users can get a hand on
-bridge addresses. Yawning Angel also just released [XXX] the first
-version of obfsclient [XXX] which should help making ScrambleSuit
-available on Android devices. All in all, the Tor community can
-hope to welcome back more users from China in a near future.
-
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-to-read-our-china-usage-graphs
- [XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=userstats-bridge-country&start=2011-10-18&end=2014-01-16&country=cn#userstats-bridge-country
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-qa/2014-March/000364.html
- [XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git/blob/refs/heads/master:/doc/obfs3/obfs3-protocol-spec.txt
- [XXX]: https://fteproxy.org/
- [XXX]: https://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/
- [XXX]: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/strategies-getting-more-bridge-addresses
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003886.html
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006476.html
- [XXX]: https://github.com/Yawning/obfsclient
+distributor [11] to improve how censored users can get a hand on bridge
+addresses. Yawning Angel also just released [12] the first version of
+obfsclient [13] which should help making ScrambleSuit available on
+Android devices. All in all, the Tor community can hope to welcome back
+more users from China in a near future.
+
+ [1]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-to-read-our-china-usage-graphs
+ [2]: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=userstats-bridge-country&start=2011-10-18&end=2014-01-16&country=cn#userstats-bridge-country
+ [3]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-qa/2014-March/000364.html
+ [4]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html
+ [5]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git/blob/refs/heads/master:/doc/obfs3/obfs3-protocol-spec.txt
+ [6]: https://fteproxy.org/
+ [7]: https://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/
+ [8]: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/
+ [9]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/strategies-getting-more-bridge-addresses
+ [10]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003886.html
+ [11]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git
+ [12]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006476.html
+ [13]: https://github.com/Yawning/obfsclient
Circumventing censorship through “too-big-too-block” websites
-------------------------------------------------------------
-Late January, David Fifield introduced [XXX] a new pluggable transport called
-“meek” [XXX]. It can be described as “a transport that uses HTTP for carrying
-bytes and TLS for obfuscation. Traffic is relayed through a third-party server
-(Google App Engine). It uses a trick to talk to the third party so that
-it looks like it is talking to an unblocked server.” The approach is close
-to the GoAgent [XXX] proxy that has a certain popularity in China.
-
-With the current version, using Google App Engine, the transport requires
-no additional configuration. But David also mentioned that a PHP
-script [XXX] could also be a good candidate to relay the traffic.
-Combined to ScrambleSuit [XXX], it could allow “a real web site with
-real pages and everything” to be used as a bridge if a user can provide
-the shared secret.
-
-David has made available experimental versions [XXX] of the Tor Browser
-for anyone to try. The source code [XXX] has recently moved [XXX] to the
+Late January, David Fifield introduced [14] a new pluggable transport
+called “meek” [15]. It can be described as “a transport that uses HTTP
+for carrying bytes and TLS for obfuscation. Traffic is relayed through a
+third-party server (Google App Engine). It uses a trick to talk to the
+third party so that it looks like it is talking to an unblocked server.”
+The approach is close to the GoAgent [16] proxy that has a certain
+popularity in China.
+
+With the current version, using Google App Engine, the transport
+requires no additional configuration. But David also mentioned that a
+PHP script [17] could also be a good candidate to relay the traffic.
+Combined to ScrambleSuit [18], it could allow “a real web site with real
+pages and everything” to be used as a bridge if a user can provide the
+shared secret.
+
+David has made available experimental versions [19] of the Tor Browser
+for anyone to try. The source code [20] has recently moved [21] to the
Tor Project's infrastructure, and is ready for more eyes and fingers to
play with it.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-January/006159.html
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/GoAgent
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10984
- [XXX]: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-qa/2014-February/000340.html
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/meek.git
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006506.html
+ [14]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-January/006159.html
+ [15]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek
+ [16]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/GoAgent
+ [17]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10984
+ [18]: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/
+ [19]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-qa/2014-February/000340.html
+ [20]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/meek.git
+ [21]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006506.html
Switching to a single guard node?
---------------------------------
-Last October, Roger Dingledine called for research on improving
-Tor's anonymity by changing guard parameters. One of these parameters is
+Last October, Roger Dingledine called for research on improving Tor's
+anonymity by changing guard parameters [22]. One of these parameters is
the number of guard nodes used simultenously by a Tor client.
-Following up on the paper written by Tariq Elahi et al. [XXX],
-Roger's blog post, and recent discussions during the winter dev.
-meeting, George Kadianakis made a detailed analysis of the implications of
-switching to a single guard node [XXX]. He studied the performance
+Following up on the paper written by Tariq Elahi et al. [23], Roger's
+blog post, and recent discussions during the winter dev. meeting,
+George Kadianakis made a detailed analysis of the implications of
+switching to a single guard node [24]. He studied the performance
implications of switching to a single guard, the performance
implications of raising the minimum guard bandwidth for both clients and
the overall network, and the change would affect the overall anonymity
and fingerprintability of Tor users.
Jumping to conclusions: “It seems that the performance implications of
-switching to 1 guard are not terrible. […] A guard bandwidth threshold
-of 2MB/s […] seems like it would considerably improve client performance
+switching to 1 guard are not terrible. […] A guard bandwidth threshold
+of 2MB/s […] seems like it would considerably improve client performance
without screwing terribly with the security or the total performance of
-the network. The fingerprinting problem will be improved in some cases, but still
-remains unsolved for many of the users […] A proper solution might
-involve guard node buckets [XXX]”.
+the network. The fingerprinting problem will be improved in some cases,
+but still remains unsolved for many of the users […] A proper solution
+might involve guard node buckets [25]”.
For a better understanding, be sure to look at George's work which
includes graphs and proper explainations.
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters
- [XXX]: http://freehaven.net/~arma/cogs-wpes.pdf
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006458.html
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9273#comment:4
+ [22]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters
+ [23]: http://freehaven.net/~arma/cogs-wpes.pdf
+ [24]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006458.html
+ [25]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9273#comment:4
Miscellaneous news
------------------
-George Kadianakis announced [XXX] obfsproxy version 0.2.7. The new release
-fixes an important bug [XXX] “where scramblesuit would basically reject clients if
-they try to connect a second time after a short amount of time has passed.”
-Bridge operators are strongly advised to upgrade from source [XXX], pip [XXX]
-or the upcoming Debian packages.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-March/004074.html
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11100
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git/commit/6cdbc64
- [XXX]: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/obfsproxy/0.2.7
-
-The submission deadline for this year's Google Summer of Code [XXX] is
+George Kadianakis announced [26] obfsproxy version 0.2.7. The new
+release fixes an important bug [27] “where scramblesuit would basically
+reject clients if they try to connect a second time after a short amount
+of time has passed.” Bridge operators are strongly advised to upgrade
+from source [28], pip [29] or the upcoming Debian packages.
+
+ [26]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-March/004074.html
+ [27]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11100
+ [28]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git/commit/6cdbc64
+ [29]: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/obfsproxy/0.2.7
+
+The submission deadline for this year's Google Summer of Code [30] is
the 21st: this Friday. Several students already showed up on the tor-dev
-mailing list, but as Damian Johnson says [XXX]: “If you're
+mailing list, but as Damian Johnson says [31]: “If you're
procrastinating until the last minute then please don't!”
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-google-summer-code-2014
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006498.html
-
-Tails logo contest [XXX] is happily on-going. Several submissions have
-already been received and can be seen on the relevant blueprint [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/news/
- [XXX]: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/
+ [30]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-google-summer-code-2014
+ [31]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-March/006498.html
+
+Tails logo contest [32] is happily on-going. Several submissions have
+already been received and can be seen on the relevant blueprint [33].
+
+ [32]: https://tails.boum.org/news/
+ [33]: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/
Kelley Misata and Karen Reilly attended the South by Southwest (SXSW)
-Interactive festival [XXX] in Austin, Texas.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000485.html
-
-Relay and bridge operators might be interested in Ramo's first release [XXX] of
-a Tor plugin for Nagios [XXX]. It can currently check for a page fetch through
-the SOCKS proxy port, the hibernation state, the current bandwidth, ORPort
-reachability, DirPort reachability and the bytes remaining until hibernation.
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-March/004062.html
- [XXX]: https://github.com/goodvikings/tor_nagios
-
-Nicolas Vigier sent his monthly report for February [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000486.html
-
-Tails won the 2014 Endpoint Security prize [XXX] from Access. The prize
-recognizes [XXX] Tails “unique positive impact on the endpoint security of
-at-risk users in need”. Congrats!
-
- [XXX]: https://twitter.com/accessnow/status/441043400708857856 (better find other sources than a tweet though)
- [XXX]: https://www.accessnow.org/prize
+Interactive festival [34] in Austin, Texas.
+
+ [34]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000485.html
+
+Relay and bridge operators might be interested in Ramo's first
+release [35] of a Tor plugin for Nagios [36]. It can currently check for
+a page fetch through the SOCKS proxy port, the hibernation state, the
+current bandwidth, ORPort reachability, DirPort reachability and the
+bytes remaining until hibernation.
+
+ [35]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-March/004062.html
+ [36]: https://github.com/goodvikings/tor_nagios
+
+Nicolas Vigier sent his monthly report for February [37].
+
+ [37]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-March/000486.html
+
+Tails won the 2014 Endpoint Security prize [38] from Access. The prize
+recognizes [39] Tails “unique positive impact on the endpoint security
+of at-risk users in need”. Congrats!
+
+ [38]: https://twitter.com/accessnow/status/441043400708857856 (better find other sources than a tweet though)
+ [39]: https://www.accessnow.org/prize
The Format-Transforming Encryption project at Portland State University
-received [XXX] an unexpected 100,000 USD grant from Eric Schmidt.
-
- [XXX]: http://www.oregonlive.com/silicon-forest/index.ssf/2014/03/psu_professor_wins_surprise_10.html
+received [40] an unexpected 100,000 USD grant from Eric Schmidt.
+
+ [40]: http://www.oregonlive.com/silicon-forest/index.ssf/2014/03/psu_professor_wins_surprise_10.html
Tor help desk roundup
---------------------
@@ -187,9 +191,9 @@
amidst news that the Russian Federation began censoring a number of
websites. Unfortunately, the help desk is not able to provide support in
Russian for now. Changes in the number of Tor users by country can be
-observed on our metrics page [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html
+observed on our metrics page [41].
+
+ [41]: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html
Upcoming events
---------------
@@ -207,20 +211,15 @@
| http://today.gmu.edu/64330/
-This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by XXX, XXX, and
-XXX.
+This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Lunar, and
+Matt Pagan.
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
-important news. Please see the project page [XXX], write down your
-name and subscribe to the team mailing list [XXX] if you want to
+important news. Please see the project page [42], write down your
+name and subscribe to the team mailing list [43] if you want to
get involved!
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
+ [42]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
+ [43]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
}}}
-
-
-Possible items:
-
- * tbb meting at ''to be determined''
version 31
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-03-18T10:56:52+00:00
formatting
--- version 30
+++ version 31
@@ -183,14 +183,13 @@
Tor help desk roundup
---------------------
-The help desk has seen an increase in Russian language support
-requests amidst news that the Russian Federation began censoring
-a number of websites. Unfortunately, the help desk is not able
-to provide support in Russian for now. Changes in the number
-of Tor users by country can be observed on our metrics
-page [XXX].
-
-[XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html
+The help desk has seen an increase in Russian language support requests
+amidst news that the Russian Federation began censoring a number of
+websites. Unfortunately, the help desk is not able to provide support in
+Russian for now. Changes in the number of Tor users by country can be
+observed on our metrics page [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html
Upcoming events
---------------
@@ -224,4 +223,4 @@
Possible items:
- * tbb meting at ''to be determined''+ * tbb meting at ''to be determined''
--
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