[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages

Lunar lunar at torproject.org
Tue Jun 17 16:40:04 UTC 2014 

===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/24 ===
===========================================================================

version 36
Author: harmony
Date:   2014-06-17T15:58:04+00:00

   language fixes

--- version 35
+++ version 36
@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@
 Collecting statistics from Tor exits in a privacy-sensitive manner
 ------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-Optimizing the Tor network to better support the most common use cases
-could make a real difference in its perceived usability. Unfortunately,
-Tor is an anonymity network. Understanding what are the most common use
-cases in a way that does not endanger its users is far from being a
+Optimizing the Tor network to better support the most common use-cases
+could make a real difference to its perceived usability. Unfortunately,
+Tor is an anonymity network. Understanding what the most common use-cases
+are, in a way that does not endanger its users, is far from being a
 trivial problem.
 
-There has been some cases of inconsiderate spying of Tor network users
-in the past [XXX]. This is one of the motivation for the Tor Project to
+There has been some cases of inconsiderate spying on Tor network users
+in the past [XXX]. This is one of the motivations for the Tor Project to
 provide and research properly anonymized statistics through the
 Metrics [XXX] and CollecTor [XXX] portals.
 
@@ -61,33 +61,33 @@
 variety of compulsion attacks and compromises. Finally, the granularity
 of the statistics is reduced […] to foil correlation attacks.”
 
-PrivEx threat model is described in section 3 and matches the current
+PrivEx’s threat model is described in section 3, and matches the current
 mode of operation of the Tor network, relying on a set of mostly honest
-collectors while being able to cope with a limited amount of malicious
+collectors while being able to cope with a limited number of malicious
 nodes. Two variants are described: one “is secure in the
 honest-but-curious setting but can be disrupted by a misbehaving actor”
 while “the other is secure in the covert adversary setting in that
-misbehaving servers can be identified” but more computationally
+misbehaving servers can be identified”, but is more computationally
 expensive.
 
 Tariq mentions that implementations of the two variants of PrivEx
 described in the tech report have been created and should soon be
 released to the community. The researchers expect to “start by rolling
 out our own PrivEx-enabled exits in the Tor network and begin collecting
-destination visit statistics” around the “June-August timeframe”. The
-section 6 contains an analysis of the overhead in both CPU and bandwidth
-of the two PrivEx variants and the requirements seem reasonable.
-
-Given how privacy matters to the Tor community and all network users,
+destination visit statistics” around the “June-August timeframe”. Section
+6 contains an analysis of the overhead in both CPU and bandwidth of the
+two PrivEx variants, and the requirements seem reasonable.
+
+Given how much privacy matters to the Tor community and to all network users,
 the researchers wants “a measure of confidence that collecting data with
 PrivEx is inherently good and is being done in a responsible and
 intelligent manner”. They are therefore asking the “community at large”
-to review the design of the proposal and its implementation once
+to review the design of the proposal, and its implementation once
 released.
 
-If no fundamental flaws is discovered in the process, the Tor community
-might finally be able to enjoy better network statistics in a mid-term
-future.
+If no fundamental flaws are discovered in the process, the Tor community
+might finally be able to enjoy better network statistics in the
+not-too-distant future.
 
  [XXX]: http://www.ifca.ai/pub/fc11/wecsr11/soghoian.pdf
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-June/006999.html
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
 In a new blog post [XXX], George Kadianakis reported on some recent
 pluggable transports [XXX] developments. Some — like the release of
 Tor Browser 3.6 [XXX], the deprecation of obfs2 [XXX], the new meek
-transport [XXX], or the recently-written “Childs Garden Of Pluggable
+transport [XXX], or the recently-written “Child’s Garden Of Pluggable
 Transports” guide [XXX] should already be known to regular readers of
 Tor Weekly News.
 
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@
 
 meejah announced [XXX] a new release of txtorcon — a Twisted-based
 asynchronous Tor control protocol implementation. Version 0.10.0 adds 
-support for Twisted's endpoint strings. meejah explains: “this means that
+support for Twisted’s endpoint strings. meejah explains: “this means that
 ANY Twisted program that uses endpoints can accept ‘onion:’ strings to
 bring up a hidden services easily […]. Typically, no code changes to
 the application should be needed […].”
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
 
  [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-June/033250.html
 
-Chris Double outlined [XXX] a detailed but experimental method for using
+Chris Double described [XXX] a detailed but experimental method for using
 Tor with Firefox OS, the mobile operating system from Mozilla. “This
 is just a proof of concept. Don’t depend on this […] Ideally Tor would be
 integrated with Firefox OS so that you can start and stop it as a service
@@ -230,23 +230,23 @@
 News from Tor StackExchange
 ---------------------------
 
-bk201 found some randomly looking domain names in the logs of some
+bk201 found some random-looking domain names in the logs of some
 network software. These connection attempts disappeared when Tor was
-closed [XXX]. So bk201 wants to know what they are. Lunar explained
-that they are requests for non-existant domain names. Tor wants to
+closed [XXX], so bk201 wants to know what they are. Lunar explained
+that they are requests for non-existent domain names. Tor wants to
 find out if some DNS servers send fake answers. This feature was
 added in 2007 [XXX].
 
  [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/3324/88
  [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/ReleaseNotes#l6663
 
-user1747 often visits web sites which provide their services within the 
-visible web and as hidden service. DuckDuckGo might serve as an example.
+user1747 often visits web sites which provide their services both within the 
+visible web and as a hidden service (DuckDuckGo might serve as an example).
 Does the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB) automatically switch to a hidden service
 in this case [XXX]? mirimir explained that there is no connection between
-DNS and the names of hidden services. So TBB doesn't not know about this
-hidden service and can't connect automatically. user2949 pointed to a
-plugin [XXX] similar to HTTPS Everywhere. This plugin forwards a request to
+DNS and the names of hidden services, so TBB doesn’t know about this
+hidden service and can’t connect automatically. user2949 pointed to a
+plugin [XXX], similar to HTTPS Everywhere, that forwards a request to
 a hidden service if it is available.
 
  [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/3262/88
@@ -283,6 +283,4 @@
 
   [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
   [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
-}}}
-
-Possible items:
+}}}



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