[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Sat Feb 15 14:40:06 UTC 2014
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==== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/7 ====
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version 17
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-02-15T13:57:27+00:00
not sure if i worded that clearly
--- version 16
+++ version 17
@@ -45,11 +45,11 @@
censorship system currently seems to block bridges by IP:port tuples,
rather than by IP address alone, the mere presence of an
easily-discoverable pluggable transport protocol (or a public relay) on
-a given machine makes it more likely that a censor will be able to
-defeat protections such as those offered by ScrambleSuit. “So you are
-right, only running ScrambleSuit gives your bridge more protection than
-running other protocols at the same time -- at the cost of attracting
-less users, however”, he concluded.
+a given machine makes it more likely that a censor will be motivated to
+try and defeat protections such as those offered by ScrambleSuit. “So
+you are right, only running ScrambleSuit gives your bridge more
+protection than running other protocols at the same time -- at the cost
+of attracting less users, however”, he concluded.
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003906.html
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003907.html
version 16
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-02-15T13:55:06+00:00
add andrea's reports/obfs3-scramblesuit item
--- version 15
+++ version 16
@@ -25,23 +25,48 @@
attacking by an adversary who finds breaking 1024-bit crypto doable”, as
Roger wrote.
-You can read the full changelog in Roger's announcement, and download the
-new release from the Tor Project website [XXX].
+You can read the full changelog in Roger's announcement, and download
+the new release from the Tor Project website [XXX].
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-February/032150.html
[XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/dist/
-Monthly status reports for XXX month 2014
------------------------------------------
+Only as good as your weakest transport?
+---------------------------------------
-The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
-month of XXX has begun. XXX released his report first [XXX], followed
-by reports from name 2 [XXX], name 3 [XXX], and name 4 [XXX].
+Delton Barnes pointed out [XXX] that although the ScrambleSuit pluggable
+transport protocol includes a certain amount of protection against
+active probing for bridges by censorship systems like the Chinese ’Great
+Firewall’, bridge operators who run more vulnerable protocols like obfs3
+alongside ScrambleSuit may be increasing the risk that censors will
+discover their relay and block connections to it of any kind.
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
+In reply, Philipp Winter conceded [XXX] that although the Chinese
+censorship system currently seems to block bridges by IP:port tuples,
+rather than by IP address alone, the mere presence of an
+easily-discoverable pluggable transport protocol (or a public relay) on
+a given machine makes it more likely that a censor will be able to
+defeat protections such as those offered by ScrambleSuit. “So you are
+right, only running ScrambleSuit gives your bridge more protection than
+running other protocols at the same time -- at the cost of attracting
+less users, however”, he concluded.
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003906.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003907.html
+
+Monthly status reports for January 2014
+---------------------------------------
+
+Andrea Shepard submitted seven status reports, covering her activity since
+July 2013 [XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX].
+
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000455.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000456.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000457.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000458.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000459.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000460.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000461.html
Miscellaneous news
------------------
@@ -50,13 +75,15 @@
of connections to Tor Hidden Services by using circuits of only five hops,
and asked the community for feedback [XXX].
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-February/006198.html
+
Yawning Angel called for help with testing obfsclient, a C++ pluggable
transport client, and clarified the next steps in the development process [XXX].
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-February/006211.html
+
Item 3 with cited source [XXX].
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-February/006198.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-February/006211.html
[XXX]:
Tor help desk roundup
@@ -103,14 +130,5 @@
* Thunderbird and autoconfig https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10836#comment:12
* https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Grants:IdeaLab/Partnership_between_Wikimedia_community_and_Tor_community
* fteproxy ready for TBB https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-February/006223.html
- * obfs3 a risk to scramblesuit? https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-February/003906.html
- * Andrea's late reports:
- - July https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000455.html
- - August https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000456.html
- - September https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000457.html
- - October https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000458.html
- - November https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000459.html
- - December https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000460.html
- - January https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-February/000461.html
* corridor, a Tor traffic whitelisting gateway https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-February/032152.html
* Proposal 227: Include package fingerprints in consensus documents https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-February/006230.html
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