[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages

Wed Feb 12 07:00:04 UTC 2014

===========================================================================
==== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/6 ====
===========================================================================

version 59
Author: beseemer
Date:   2014-02-12T06:14:39+00:00

   a few language changes. also, replaced "reprehensible" with "a
   punishable offense", in the tor-legality section

--- version 58
+++ version 59
@@ -17,33 +17,31 @@
 Tails 0.22.1 is out
 -------------------
 
-The Tails team has cut its 36th release on February 4th. Their live
-operating system based on Debian continues to provide anonymity by
-ensuring that all outgoing connections are routed through Tor, and
-privacy by ensuring that no traces are left without the user’s
-knowledge.
+The Tails team cut its 36th release on February 4th. Their Debian-based
+live operating system continues to provide anonymity by ensuring that all
+outgoing connections are routed through Tor, and privacy by ensuring that
+no traces are left without the user’s knowledge.
 
 Tails 0.22.1 [1] contains security fixes [2] to Firefox, NSS, and Pidgin.
 It also brings an updated Linux kernel and several fixes for regressions
 and small issues.
 
-While advertised as a minor version, the new version brings a major
-usability improvement as incremental upgrades are now enabled.
-Previously, upgrading Tails basically meant installing Tails again by
-downloading the image and putting it on a DVD or a USB stick. Users who
-store persistent data in their Tails instance then had to use this new
-medium to upgrade the stick with their data. A tedious process, to say
-the least. Now, with incremental upgrades, Tails users with USB sticks
-will be prompted to perform a few clicks, wait, and reboot to get their
-system up-to-date.
+While advertised as a minor version, the new incremental upgrades are a
+major usability improvement. Previously, upgrading Tails basically
+meant installing Tails again by downloading the image and putting it on
+a DVD or a USB stick. Users who store persistent data in their Tails
+instance then had to use this new medium to upgrade the stick with
+their data. A tedious process, to say the least. Now, with incremental
+upgrades, Tails users with USB sticks will be prompted to perform a few
+clicks, wait, and reboot to get their system up-to-date.
 
 One usability change might surprise long time Tails users: the browser
 now has to be manually opened when Tor has successfully reached the
 network. 
 
 As always, be sure to upgrade [3]! Users of Tails 0.22 on USB sticks can
-easily do so by reaching out for the “Tails Upgrader” application in the
-“Tails” menu.
+do so easily by running the “Tails Upgrader” application in the “Tails”
+menu.
 
    [1]: https://tails.boum.org/news/version_0.22.1/
    [2]: https://tails.boum.org/security/Numerous_security_holes_in_0.22/
@@ -69,24 +67,26 @@
 Call to bridge operators to deploy ScrambleSuit
 -----------------------------------------------
 
-In the beginning there was Tor. Then censors started to filter every
-known relay address. So bridges [8] were invented as a way to access the
-Tor network through unlisted relays. Then DPI systems started to filter
-Tor based on its traffic signature. So pluggable transports were
-designed [9] and obfucation protocols to prevent bridges detection.
+In the beginning there was Tor. When censors started filtering every known
+relay address, bridges [8] were invented as a way to access the Tor
+network through unlisted relays. Deep packet inspection systems then
+started to filter Tor based on its traffic signature, so pluggable
+transports [9] and obfucation protocols were designed in order to
+prevent bridge detection.
 
 Currently, obfuscation is achieved through “obfs2” and “obfs3”. obfs2 is
-being phased out as it is flawed and can be recognized by deep packet
-inspection. obfs3 is unfortunately still vulnerable to active attackers.
-As an obfs3 bridge is open to anyone, an attacker who uses a traffic
-classifier and finds an unclassified connection can figure out if it’s
-Tor simply by trying to connect to the same destination.
+flawed; it's detectable by deep packet inspection and is being phased
+out. obfs3 is unfortunately still vulnerable to active probing
+attacks. As obfs3 bridges are open to anyone, an attacker who uses a
+traffic classifier and finds an unclassified connection can figure out
+if it’s Tor simply by trying to connect to the same destination and
+trying to speak the Tor protocol to it.
 
 ScrambleSuit [10] comes to the rescue. On top of making the traffic
 harder to recognize by timing or volume characteristics, ScrambleSuit
-also shares a secret between the bridge and the client. A censor looking
-at the connection would not have this secret, and therefore be unable
-to connect to the bridge and confirm that it's Tor.
+requires a shared secret between the bridge and the client. A censor
+looking at the connection won't have this secret, and therefore be
+unable to connect to the bridge and confirm that it's Tor.
 
 obfsproxy 0.2.6 was released last week [11] and adds ScrambleSuit to the
 set of available pluggable transports. Bridge operators are now
@@ -94,8 +94,8 @@
 0.2.5.1-alpha is required. The latest version of obfsproxy can be
 installed from source [13], pip [14] and Debian unstable [15].
 
-It is very important to get enough bridges ready before offering
-ScrambleSuit to Tor users who need it. Please help!
+There must be a critical mass of bridges before ScrambleSuit is made
+available to the Tor users who need it, so please help!
 
    [8]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/proposals/125-bridges.txt
    [9]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/pt-spec.txt
@@ -131,14 +131,14 @@
 ------------------
 
 Most Tor developers will gather next week in Reykjavík, Iceland for the
-2014 winter meeting [25]. Expect a drop of activity on the usual
+2014 winter meeting [25]. Expect a drop in activity on the usual
 communication channels while everyone is busy with face-to-face
 conversations. See upcoming events below for activities open to the
 larger Tor community.
 
   [25]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2014WinterDevMeeting
 
-David Fifield is looking for testers [26] for experimental 3.5.2 bundles
+David Fifield is looking for testers [26] for experimental 3.5.2 browser bundles
 with tor-fw-helper. “tor-fw-helper is a tool that uses UPnP or NAT-PMP
 to forward a port automatically” — something that flashproxy [27]
 requires. David is “interested in finding out how likely it is to work”.
@@ -179,17 +179,17 @@
 Tor help desk roundup
 ---------------------
 
-Tor supporters can be curious about the legal risks involved in running
-a Tor relay. The Tor Project is not aware of any country where running
-Tor is reprehensible. Running a bridge relay or a non-exit relay is the
-best way to grow the Tor network without being exposed to additional
-legal scrutiny. Running an exit relay should be decided only after
-carefully reviewing the best practices [34]. Unlike non-exit and bridge
-operators, exit relay operators need to be prepared to respond to abuse
-complaints.
-
-Users continue to express interest in a Windows 64-bit Tor Browser
-Bundle.  Work to provide this new variant is on-going [35].
+Tor supporters are often curious about the legal risks involved in
+running a Tor relay. The Tor Project is not aware of any country where
+running Tor is a punishable offense. Running a bridge relay or a
+non-exit relay is the best way to grow the Tor network without being
+exposed to additional legal scrutiny. The decision to run an exit relay
+should be made only after carefully reviewing the best practices
+[34]. Unlike non-exit and bridge operators, exit relay operators need
+to be prepared to respond to abuse complaints.
+
+Users continue to express interest in a 64-bit Tor Browser Bundle for
+Windows. Work to provide this new variant is on-going [35].
 
   [34]: https://blog.torproject.org/running-exit-node
   [35]: https://bugs.torproject.org/10026



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