[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Feb 11 09:00:08 UTC 2014
===========================================================================
==== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/6 ====
===========================================================================
version 40
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-02-11T08:18:59+00:00
mention thedaywefightback
--- version 39
+++ version 40
@@ -163,6 +163,11 @@
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-February/032094.html
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-February/032096.html
+
+On February 11th, the Tor Project participated on “The Day We Fight Back” [XXX],
+a global day of mobilization against NSA mass surveillance.
+
+ [XXX]: https://thedaywefightback.org/
Tor help desk roundup
---------------------
version 39
Author: karsten
Date: 2014-02-11T07:39:44+00:00
Minor language tweaks, and attempt to rephrase "users of persistence"
to something better.
--- version 38
+++ version 39
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@
usability improvement as incremental upgrades are now enabled.
Previously, upgrading Tails basically meant installing Tails again
by downloading the image, and putting it on a DVD or a USB stick. Users
-of persistence then had to use this new medium to upgrade the stick with
+who store persistent data in their Tails instance
+then had to use this new medium to upgrade the stick with
their data. A tedious process, to say the least. Now, with incremental
upgrades, Tails users with USB sticks will be prompted to perform a few
clicks, wait, and reboot to get their system up-to-date.
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@
the welcome screen with right-to-left language, among others.
The curious can take a pick at the changelog [XXX] for more details.
-Every Tor users is encouraged to upgrade as soon possible. Jump to the
+Every Tor user is encouraged to upgrade as soon possible. Jump to the
download page [XXX]!
[XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-352-released
@@ -70,9 +71,9 @@
known relay address. So bridges [XXX] were invented as a way to access
the Tor network through unlisted relays. Then DPI systems started to
filter Tor based on its traffic signature. So pluggable transports were
-designed [XXX] and obfsucation protocols to prevent bridges detection.
-
-Currently, obfsuscation is achieved through “obfs2” and “obfs3”. obfs2
+designed [XXX] and obfucation protocols to prevent bridges detection.
+
+Currently, obfuscation is achieved through “obfs2” and “obfs3”. obfs2
is being phased out as it is flawed and can be recognized by deep packet
inspection. obfs3 is unfortunately still vulnerable to active attackers.
As an obfs3 bridge is open to anyone, an attacker looking at an
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@
One relay started to act funny regarding its advertised bandwidth. Roger Dingledine
quickly reported his worries [XXX] to the tor-talk mailing list.
-A couple of hours later Hyoung-Kee Choi reported that one of the student from
+A couple of hours later Hyoung-Kee Choi reported that one of the students from
his research group had made a mistake while experimenting on the Tor bandwidth
scanner. Directory authorities are now restricting its usage in the consensus.
version 38
Author: qbi
Date: 2014-02-11T07:15:24+00:00
Tor.SE open question regarding µTorrent
--- version 37
+++ version 38
@@ -205,6 +205,13 @@
[XXX]: http://kubieziel.de/blog/archives/1564-Using-SSL-securely-in-your-browser.html
[XXX]: https://ssl-stats.hacked.jp/
[XXX]: https://blog.samwhited.com/2014/01/fixing-tls-in-firefox/
+
+fred set up a relay on his Windows machine and uses µTorrent besides Tor. He
+notices a drop in trackers when he enables Tor. They come back as soon as he
+disables his relay [XXX]. The answer to his question is still open. If any
+reader knows the answer, don't hesitate.
+
+ [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1243/88
Upcoming events
---------------
version 37
Author: qbi
Date: 2014-02-11T07:04:50+00:00
Tor.SE SSL in Firefox
--- version 36
+++ version 37
@@ -190,6 +190,21 @@
[XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1485/88
[XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/tor-0.2.4.20:/src/or/router.c#l1018
+
+Ivar noted that the site How's my SSL[XXX] thinks that the SSL configuration
+of the Tor Browser is bad and wondered how he can improve it. [XXX] Jens
+Kubieziel explained some settings for about:config and pointed to a blog
+post [XXX]. There he discusses the settings of different browsers and the
+minimum SSL/TLS version. Jens has a listing of sites with their supported
+versions [XXX]. In the moment many don't support TLS 1.1 or better.
+Sam Whited also pointed out some settings for Firefox and noted that
+Firefox 27 was just released which lifts the rating to 'probably good' [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]: https://www.howsmyssl.com/
+ [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1455/88
+ [XXX]: http://kubieziel.de/blog/archives/1564-Using-SSL-securely-in-your-browser.html
+ [XXX]: https://ssl-stats.hacked.jp/
+ [XXX]: https://blog.samwhited.com/2014/01/fixing-tls-in-firefox/
Upcoming events
---------------
version 36
Author: qbi
Date: 2014-02-11T06:45:19+00:00
Tor.SE: DirPort + V2Dir
--- version 35
+++ version 36
@@ -179,6 +179,17 @@
[XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/running-exit-node
[XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/10026
+
+News from Tor StackExchange
+---------------------------
+
+strugee has a fast, running and valid relay running, but he wondered when
+it will get the V2Dir flag [XXX]. He had the DirPort set. However when he
+connects with Telnet to this port, it was not reachable. weasel suggested
+that it depends on many factors and advised to have a look at router.c [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/1485/88
+ [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/tor-0.2.4.20:/src/or/router.c#l1018
Upcoming events
---------------
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