[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Aug 12 22:40:07 UTC 2014
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/32 ===
===========================================================================
version 38
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-08-12T22:08:32+00:00
re-add phw
--- version 37
+++ version 38
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Lunar, qbi,
-Karsten Loesing, and harmony.
+Karsten Loesing, harmony, and Philipp Winter.
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
version 37
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-08-12T22:05:32+00:00
small fixes
--- version 36
+++ version 37
@@ -17,22 +17,22 @@
Torsocks 2.0 is now considered stable
-------------------------------------
-Torsocks [1] is a wrapper program that will force network connections of
-an application to go through the Tor network. David Goulet released [2]
-version 2.0.0, blessing the new codebase as stable after more than a
-year of efforts [3].
+Torsocks [1] is a wrapper program that will force an application’s
+network connections to go through the Tor network. David Goulet
+released [2] version 2.0.0, blessing the new codebase as stable after
+more than a year of efforts [3].
David’s original email highlighted several reasons for a complete
rewrite of torsocks. Among the issues were maintainability, error
-handling, thread safety, and the lack of a proper compatibility layer
-for multiple architectures. The new implementation addresses all these
-issues while staying about the same size as the previous version
-(4,000 lines of C according to sloccount), and test coverage has been
-extended vastly.
-
-Torsocks comes in handy when some piece of software does not natively
-support using a SOCKS proxy. In most cases, the new version might be
-safer as torsocks will prevent DNS requests and non-torified
+handling, thread safety, and a lack of proper compatibility layer for
+multiple architectures. The new implementation addresses all these
+issues while staying about the same size as the previous version (4000
+lines of C according to sloccount), and test coverage has been vastly
+extended.
+
+Torsocks comes in handy when a piece of software does not natively
+support the use of a SOCKS proxy. In most cases, the new version may be
+safer, as torsocks will prevent DNS requests and non-torified
connections from happening.
Integrators and power users should watch their steps while migrating to
@@ -50,28 +50,28 @@
When Tor clients need to connect to a Hidden Service, the first step is
to create a circuit to its “Introduction Point”. There, the Tor client
serving the Hidden Service will be waiting through another circuit to
-agree on a “Rendez-vous Point” and peruse the communication through
+agree on a “Rendezvous Point” and pursue the communication through
circuits connecting to this freshly selected Tor node.
-This general design is not subject to changes with the revision of
+This general design is not subject to any changes in the revision of
hidden services [4] currently being worked on. But there are still some
-questions left unanswered on the best way to select Introduction Points.
+questions left unanswered regarding the best way to select Introduction Points.
George Kadianakis summarized [5] them as: “How many IPs should an HS
have? Which relays can be IPs? What’s the lifetime of an IP?”
-For each of these questions, George collected possible answers and how
-they could answer or not to several attacks identified in the past.
+For each of these questions, George collected possible answers and assessed
+whether or not they could respond to several attacks identified in the past.
Anyone interested should help with the research needed and join the
discussion.
In the meantime, Michael Rogers is also trying to find ways [6] to
-improve hidden services performance in mobile contexts. One way to do so
+improve hidden service performance in mobile contexts. One way to do so
would be to “keep the set of introduction points as stable as possible”.
-But a naive approach of doing so would ease the job of attackers trying
+However, a naive approach to doing so would ease the job of attackers trying
to locate a hidden service. The idea would be to always use the same
-guard and middle node for a given introduction point. But this might
+guard and middle node for a given introduction point, but this might
also open the doors to new attacks. Michael suggests experimenting with
-the recently published Java research framework [7] to get better
+the recently published Java research framework [7] to gain a better
understanding of the implications.
[4]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@
The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
month of July continued, with submissions from Andrew Lewman [8], Colin
-C. [9], Damian Johnson [10]..
+C. [9], and Damian Johnson [10].
Roger Dingledine sent out the report for SponsorF [11]. Arturo Filastò
described what the OONI team [12] was up to. The Tails team covered
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@
The recent serious attack against Tor hidden services [16] was also a
Sybil attack: a large number of malicious nodes joined the network at
-once. This renewed interest in detecting Sybil attacks against the Tor
-network better. Karsten Loesing published some code [17] computing
+once. This led to a renewal of interest in detecting Sybil attacks against the Tor
+network more quickly. Karsten Loesing published some code [17] computing
similarity metrics, and David Fifield has explored visualizations [18]
of the consensus that made the recent attack visible.
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
[17]: https://github.com/kloesing/SAD
[18]: https://bugs.torproject.org/12813
-Gareth Owen has sent an update [19] about the Java Tor Research
+Gareth Owen sent out an update [19] about the Java Tor Research
Framework. This prompted a discussion with George Kadianakis and Tim
about the best way to perform fuzz testing [20] on Tor. Have a look if
you want to comment on Tim’s approaches [21].
@@ -136,21 +136,21 @@
bitcoins and redistribute them to relay operators who put a bitcoin
address in their contact information. As the redistribution is currently
done according to the consensus weight, Sebastian Hahn warned [25] that
-this might encourage one to “cheat the consensus weight” because that
+this might encourage people to “cheat the consensus weight” because that
now means “more money from oniontip”.
[23]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-August/005073.html
[24]: https://oniontip.com/
[25]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-August/005077.html
-Juha Nurmi sent another update [26] on the ahmia.fi GSoC.
+Juha Nurmi sent another update [26] on the ahmia.fi GSoC project.
[26]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000620.html
News from Tor StackExchange
---------------------------
-arvee wants to redirect some TCP connections through Tor on OS X.
+arvee wants to redirect some TCP connections through Tor on OS X;
Redsocks [27] should help to route packets for port 443 over Tor [28].
mirimir explained that given the user's pf configuration, the setting
“SocksPort 8888” was probably missing.
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@
[27]: http://darkk.net.ru/redsocks/
[28]: https://tor.stackexchange.com/q/3802/88
-meee asked a question and offered a bounty for an answer. The circuit handshake
-entry in Tor’s log file has some numbers and meee wants to know what
+meee asked a question and offered a bounty for an answer: the circuit handshake
+entry in Tor’s log file contains some numbers, and meee wants to know what
their meaning is [29]: “Circuit handshake stats since last time:
1833867/1833868 TAP, 159257/159257 NTor.”
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Lunar, qbi,
-Karsten Loesing, harmony, and Philipp Winter.
+Karsten Loesing, and harmony.
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
version 36
Author: phw
Date: 2014-08-12T22:01:10+00:00
Fix grammer, phrasing, and spelling.
--- version 35
+++ version 36
@@ -23,15 +23,16 @@
year of efforts [3].
David’s original email highlighted several reasons for a complete
-rewrite of torsocks. Among the issues were maintanability, error
-handling, thread safety, lack proper compatibility layer for multiple
-architectures. The new implementation addresses all these issues while
-staying about the same size as the previous version (4000 lines of C
-according to sloccount), and test coverage has been vastly extended.
+rewrite of torsocks. Among the issues were maintainability, error
+handling, thread safety, and the lack of a proper compatibility layer
+for multiple architectures. The new implementation addresses all these
+issues while staying about the same size as the previous version
+(4,000 lines of C according to sloccount), and test coverage has been
+extended vastly.
Torsocks comes in handy when some piece of software does not natively
support using a SOCKS proxy. In most cases, the new version might be
-safer as torsocks will prevent DNS requests and non-torrified
+safer as torsocks will prevent DNS requests and non-torified
connections from happening.
Integrators and power users should watch their steps while migrating to
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@
When Tor clients need to connect to a Hidden Service, the first step is
to create a circuit to its “Introduction Point”. There, the Tor client
serving the Hidden Service will be waiting through another circuit to
-agree on a “Rendez-vous Point” and persue the communication through
+agree on a “Rendez-vous Point” and peruse the communication through
circuits connecting to this freshly selected Tor node.
This general design is not subject to changes with the revision of
@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@
address in their contact information. As the redistribution is currently
done according to the consensus weight, Sebastian Hahn warned [25] that
this might encourage one to “cheat the consensus weight” because that
-now mans “more money from oniontip”.
+now means “more money from oniontip”.
[23]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-August/005073.html
[24]: https://oniontip.com/
@@ -204,7 +205,7 @@
This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Lunar, qbi,
-Karsten Loesing, and harmony.
+Karsten Loesing, harmony, and Philipp Winter.
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
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