[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Aug 5 17:00:08 UTC 2014
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/31 ===
===========================================================================
version 47
Author: karsten
Date: 2014-08-05T16:20:24+00:00
Fix some very minor things.
--- version 46
+++ version 47
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
but, as Roger wrote, “the attacker encoded the name of the hidden
service in the injected signal (as opposed to, say, sending a random
number and keeping a local list mapping random number to hidden service
-name)”, thereby “ [putting] users at risk indefinitely into the future”.
+name)”, thereby “[putting] users at risk indefinitely into the future”.
On the other hand, it is important to note that “while this particular
variant of the traffic confirmation attack allows high-confidence and
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
ports and the set of behavior we do is public, then again relays are
free to mess with things we don’t look for.”
-A better future and more transparency probably lies in adaptative test
+A better future and more transparency probably lies in adaptive test
systems run by multiple volunteer groups. Until they come to existence,
as a small improvement, Philipp Winter wrote [9] it was probably safe to
publish why relays were disabled, through “short sentence along the
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@
[35]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007288.html
[36]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007293.html
-The Tails team is looking for testers to solve a possible incompatiblity
+The Tails team is looking for testers to solve a possible incompatibility
in one of the recommended installation procedures. If you have a running
Tails system, a spare USB stick and some time, please help [37]. Don’t
miss the recommended command-line options [38]!
version 46
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-08-05T15:54:07+00:00
FREEZE
--- version 45
+++ version 46
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
'''Editor:''' Lunar
'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — August 6th, 2014
+
+'''Status:''' Frozen. Language and technical fixes only. New items should go in [wiki:TorWeeklyNews/2014/32 next week's edition]. Expected publication time: 2014-08-06 12:00 UTC.
{{{
========================================================================
@@ -17,7 +19,7 @@
Roger Dingledine ended several months of concern and speculation in the
Tor community with a security advisory posted to the tor-announce
-mailing list [XXX] and the Tor blog [XXX].
+mailing list [1] and the Tor blog [2].
In it, he gave details of a five-month-long active attack on operators
and users of Tor hidden services that involved a variant of the
@@ -26,18 +28,18 @@
to inject a traffic header signal consisting of RELAY_EARLY cells to
“tag” any hidden service descriptor requests received by malicious
relays — a tag which could then be picked up by other bad nodes acting
-as entry guards [XXX], in the process identifying clients which
-requested information about a particular hidden service.
+as entry guards [3], in the process identifying clients which requested
+information about a particular hidden service.
The attack is suspected to be linked to a now-cancelled talk that was
-due to be delivered at the BlackHat security conference [XXX]. There
-have been several fruitful and positive research projects involving
+due to be delivered at the BlackHat security conference [4]. There have
+been several fruitful and positive research projects involving
theoretical attacks on Tor’s security, but this was not among them. Not
only were there problems with the process of responsible disclosure,
but, as Roger wrote, “the attacker encoded the name of the hidden
service in the injected signal (as opposed to, say, sending a random
number and keeping a local list mapping random number to hidden service
-name)”, thereby “[putting] users at risk indefinitely into the future”.
+name)”, thereby “ [putting] users at risk indefinitely into the future”.
On the other hand, it is important to note that “while this particular
variant of the traffic confirmation attack allows high-confidence and
@@ -59,33 +61,33 @@
for clients to move to single entry guards (rather than sets of three)
in the near future. Relay operators should be sure to upgrade; a
point-release of the Tor Browser will offer the same fixes to ordinary
-users. Nusenu suggested [XXX] that relay operators regularly check
-their logs for the new warning, “even if the attack origin is not
-directly attributable from a relay’s point of view”. Be sure to read the
-full security advisory for a fuller explanation of the attack and its
+users. Nusenu suggested [5] that relay operators regularly check their
+logs for the new warning, “even if the attack origin is not directly
+attributable from a relay’s point of view”. Be sure to read the full
+security advisory for a fuller explanation of the attack and its
implications.
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/2014-July/000094.html
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack
- [XXX]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards
- [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/recent-black-hat-2014-talk-cancellation
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-August/005046.html
+ [1]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/2014-July/000094.html
+ [2]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack
+ [3]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards
+ [4]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/recent-black-hat-2014-talk-cancellation
+ [5]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-August/005046.html
Why is bad-relays a closed mailing list?
----------------------------------------
Damian Johnson and Philipp Winter have been working on improving the
-process of reporting bad relays [XXX]. The process starts by having
-users report odd behaviors to the bad-relays mailing list.
+process of reporting bad relays [6]. The process starts by having users
+report odd behaviors to the bad-relays mailing list.
Only a few trusted volunteers receive and review these reports. Nusenu
-started a discussion on tor-talk [XXX] advocating for more transparency.
+started a discussion on tor-talk [7] advocating for more transparency.
Nusenu argues that an open list would “likely get more confirm/can’t
confirm feedback for a given badexit candidate”, and that it would allow
worried users to act faster than operators of directory authorities.
Despite being “usually on the side of transparency”, Roger Dingledine
-described [XXX] being “stuck” on the issue, “because the arms race is so
+described [8] being “stuck” on the issue, “because the arms race is so
lopsidedly against us”.
Roger explains: “we can scan for whether exit relays handle certain
@@ -97,146 +99,148 @@
A better future and more transparency probably lies in adaptative test
systems run by multiple volunteer groups. Until they come to existence,
-as a small improvement, Philipp Winter wrote [XXX] it was probably safe
-to publish why relays were disabled, through “short sentence along the
+as a small improvement, Philipp Winter wrote [9] it was probably safe to
+publish why relays were disabled, through “short sentence along the
lines of ‘running HTTPS MitM’ or ‘running sslstrip’”.
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReportingBadRelays
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034198.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034219.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034216.html
+ [6]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReportingBadRelays
+ [7]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034198.html
+ [8]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034219.html
+ [9]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034216.html
Monthly status reports for July 2014
------------------------------------
Time for monthly reports from Tor project members. The July 2014 round
-was opened by Georg Koppen [XXX], followed by Philipp Winter [XXX],
-Sherief Alaa [XXX], Lunar [XXX], Nick Mathewson [XXX], Pearl
-Crescent [XXX], George Kadianakis [XXX], Matt Pagan [XXX], Isis
-Lovecruft [XXX], Griffin Boyce [XXX], Arthur Edelstein [XXX], and
-Karsten Loesing [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-July/000598.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-July/000599.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000601.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000603.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000604.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000605.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000608.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000609.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000610.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000611.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000612.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000614.html
-
-Lunar reported on behalf of the help desk [XXX] and Mike Perry for the
-Tor Browser team [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000602.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000607.html
+was opened by Georg Koppen [10], followed by Philipp Winter [11],
+Sherief Alaa [12], Lunar [13], Nick Mathewson [14], Pearl Crescent [15],
+George Kadianakis [16], Matt Pagan [17], Isis Lovecruft [18], Griffin
+Boyce [19], Arthur Edelstein [20], and Karsten Loesing [21].
+
+ [10]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-July/000598.html
+ [11]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-July/000599.html
+ [12]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000601.html
+ [13]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000603.html
+ [14]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000604.html
+ [15]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000605.html
+ [16]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000608.html
+ [17]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000609.html
+ [18]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000610.html
+ [19]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000611.html
+ [20]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000612.html
+ [21]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000614.html
+
+Lunar reported on behalf of the help desk [22] and Mike Perry for the
+Tor Browser team [23].
+
+ [22]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000602.html
+ [23]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000607.html
Miscellaneous news
------------------
Anthony G. Basile announced a new release of tor-ramdisk, an i686 or
x86_64 uClibc-based micro Linux distribution whose only purpose is to
-host a Tor server. Version 20140801 [XXX] updates Tor to version
+host a Tor server. Version 20140801 [24] updates Tor to version
0.2.4.23, and the kernel to 3.15.7 with Gentoo’s hardened patches.
- [XXX]: http://opensource.dyc.edu/pipermail/tor-ramdisk/2014-August/000132.html
-
-meejah has announced [XXX] a new command-line application. carml is a versatile
-set of tools to “query and control a running Tor”. It can do things like “list
-and remove streams and circuits; monitor stream, circuit and address-map
-events; watch for any Tor event and print it (or many) out; monitor bandwidth;
-run any Tor control-protocol command; pipe through common Unix tools like grep,
-less, cut, etcetera; download TBB through Tor, with pinned certs and signature
-checking; and even spit out and run xplanet configs (with router/circuit
-markers)!” The application is written in Python and uses the
-txtorcon library [XXX]. meejah describes it as early-alpha and warns that it
-might contain “serious, anonymity-destroying bugs”. Watch out!
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007295.html
- [XXX]: https://github.com/meejah/carml
- [XXX]: https://txtorcon.readthedocs.org/
-
-Only two weeks left for the Google Summer of Code students, and the last round of
-reports but one: Juha Nurmi on the ahmia.fi project [XXX], Marc Juarez on
-website fingerprinting defenses [XXX], Amogh Pradeep on Orbot and Orfox
-improvements [XXX], Zack Mullaly on the HTTPS Everywhere secure ruleset update
-mechanism [XXX], Israel Leiva on the GetTor revamp [XXX], Quinn Jarrell on the
-pluggable transport combiner [XXX], Daniel Martí on incremental updates to
-consensus documents [XXX], Noah Rahman on Stegotorus enhancements [XXX],
-and Sreenatha Bhatlapenumarthi on the Tor Weather rewrite [XXX].
-
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000600.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000606.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007282.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.eff.org/pipermail/https-everywhere/2014-August/002199.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007284.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007285.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007287.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007288.html
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007293.html
+ [24]: http://opensource.dyc.edu/pipermail/tor-ramdisk/2014-August/000132.html
+
+meejah has announced [25] a new command-line application. carml [26] is
+a versatile set of tools to “query and control a running Tor”. It can do
+things like “list and remove streams and circuits; monitor stream,
+circuit and address-map events; watch for any Tor event and print it (or
+many) out; monitor bandwidth; run any Tor control-protocol command; pipe
+through common Unix tools like grep, less, cut, etcetera; download TBB
+through Tor, with pinned certs and signature checking; and even spit out
+and run xplanet configs (with router/circuit markers)!” The application
+is written in Python and uses the txtorcon library [27]. meejah
+describes it as early-alpha and warns that it might contain “serious,
+anonymity-destroying bugs”. Watch out!
+
+ [25]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007295.html
+ [26]: https://github.com/meejah/carml
+ [27]: https://txtorcon.readthedocs.org/
+
+Only two weeks left for the Google Summer of Code students, and the last
+round of reports but one: Juha Nurmi on the ahmia.fi project [28], Marc
+Juarez on website fingerprinting defenses [29], Amogh Pradeep on Orbot
+and Orfox improvements [30], Zack Mullaly on the HTTPS Everywhere secure
+ruleset update mechanism [31], Israel Leiva on the GetTor revamp [32],
+Quinn Jarrell on the pluggable transport combiner [33], Daniel Martí on
+incremental updates to consensus documents [34], Noah Rahman on
+Stegotorus enhancements [35], and Sreenatha Bhatlapenumarthi on the Tor
+Weather rewrite [36].
+
+ [28]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000600.html
+ [29]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-August/000606.html
+ [30]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007282.html
+ [31]: https://lists.eff.org/pipermail/https-everywhere/2014-August/002199.html
+ [32]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007284.html
+ [33]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007285.html
+ [34]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007287.html
+ [35]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007288.html
+ [36]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007293.html
The Tails team is looking for testers to solve a possible incompatiblity
-in one of the recommended installation procedures. If you have a running Tails
-system, a spare USB stick and some time, please help [XXX]. Don’t miss
-the recommended command-line options [XXX]!
-
- [XXX]: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-testers/2014-July/000059.html
- [XXX]: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-testers/2014-July/000060.html
-
-The Citizen Lab Summer Institute [XXX] took place at the University of Toronto
-from July 28 to 31. The event brought together policy and technology
-researchers who focus on Internet censorship and measurement. A lot of great
-work was presented including but not limited to a proposal to measure the
-chilling effect, ongoing work to deploy Telex [XXX], and several projects to
-measure censorship in different countries. Some Tor-related work was also
-presented: Researchers are working on understanding how the Tor network is used
-for political purposes. Another project makes use of TCP/IP side channels to
-measure the reachability of Tor relays from within China [XXX].
-
-[XXX] https://citizenlab.org/summerinstitute/2014.html
-[XXX] http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/usenix11-telex.pdf
-[XXX] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.5739.pdf
+in one of the recommended installation procedures. If you have a running
+Tails system, a spare USB stick and some time, please help [37]. Don’t
+miss the recommended command-line options [38]!
+
+ [37]: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-testers/2014-July/000059.html
+ [38]: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-testers/2014-July/000060.html
+
+The Citizen Lab Summer Institute [39] took place at the University of
+Toronto from July 28 to 31. The event brought together policy and
+technology researchers who focus on Internet censorship and measurement.
+A lot of great work was presented including but not limited to a
+proposal to measure the chilling effect, ongoing work to deploy
+Telex [40], and several projects to measure censorship in different
+countries. Some Tor-related work was also presented: Researchers are
+working on understanding how the Tor network is used for political
+purposes. Another project makes use of TCP/IP side channels to measure
+the reachability of Tor relays from within China [41].
+
+ [39]: https://citizenlab.org/summerinstitute/2014.html
+ [40]: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/usenix11-telex.pdf
+ [41]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.5739.pdf
The Electronic Frontier Foundation wrote two blog posts to show why Tor
-is important for universities and how universities can help the Tor network.
-The first part [XXX] explains why Tor matters, gives several examples of
-universities already contributing to the Tor network, and outlines a few
-reasons for hosting new Tor nodes. The second part [XXX] gives actual tips
-on where to start, and how to do it best.
-
- [XXX]: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/08/tor-campus-part-i-its-been-done-and-should-happen-again
- [XXX]: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/08/tor-campus-part-ii-icebreakers-and-risk-mitigation-strategies
+is important for universities and how universities can help the Tor
+network. The first part [42] explains why Tor matters, gives several
+examples of universities already contributing to the Tor network, and
+outlines a few reasons for hosting new Tor nodes. The second part [43]
+gives actual tips on where to start, and how to do it best.
+
+ [42]: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/08/tor-campus-part-i-its-been-done-and-should-happen-again
+ [43]: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/08/tor-campus-part-ii-icebreakers-and-risk-mitigation-strategies
Tor help desk roundup
---------------------
-Users occasionally ask if there is any way to set Tor Browser as the default
-browser on their system. Currently this is not possible, although it may be
-possible in a future Tor Browser release [XXX]. In the mean time, Tails
-provides another way to prevent accidentally opening hyperlinks in a non-Tor
-browser.
-
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/12763
+Users occasionally ask if there is any way to set Tor Browser as the
+default browser on their system. Currently this is not possible,
+although it may be possible in a future Tor Browser release [44]. In the
+mean time, Tails provides another way to prevent accidentally opening
+hyperlinks in a non-Tor browser.
+
+ [44]: https://bugs.torproject.org/12763
Easy development tasks to get involved with
-------------------------------------------
Tor Launcher is the Tor controller shipped with Tor Browser written in
JavaScript. Starting with Firefox 14 the “nsILocalFile” interface has
-been deprecated and replaced with the “nsIFile” interface [XXX]. What we
+been deprecated and replaced with the “nsIFile” interface [45]. What we
should do is replace all instances of “nsILocalFile” with “nsIFile” and
see if anything else needs fixing to make Tor Launcher still work as
expected. If you know a little bit about Firefox extensions and want to
-give this a try, clone the repository [XXX], make the necessary changes,
+give this a try, clone the repository [46], make the necessary changes,
run “make package”, and tell us whether something broke in interesting
ways.
- [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/10573
- [XXX]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git
+ [45]: https://bugs.torproject.org/10573
+ [46]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git
Upcoming events
---------------
@@ -262,10 +266,10 @@
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
-important news. Please see the project page [XXX], write down your
-name and subscribe to the team mailing list [XXX] if you want to
+important news. Please see the project page [47], write down your
+name and subscribe to the team mailing list [48] if you want to
get involved!
- [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
- [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
+ [47]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
+ [48]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
}}}
version 45
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-08-05T15:50:31+00:00
credits
--- version 44
+++ version 45
@@ -257,8 +257,8 @@
| https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14
-This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by XXX, XXX, and
-XXX.
+This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Lunar, harmony,
+Matt Pagan, Philipp Winter, David Fifield, and Roger Dingledine.
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
version 44
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-08-05T15:49:31+00:00
clean up
--- version 43
+++ version 44
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
========================================================================
Welcome to the thirty-first issue of Tor Weekly News in 2014, the weekly
-newsletter that covers what is happening in the XXX Tor community.
+newsletter that covers what is happening in the Tor community.
Tor and the RELAY_EARLY traffic confirmation attack
---------------------------------------------------
@@ -222,13 +222,6 @@
[XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/12763
-News from Tor StackExchange
----------------------------
-
-Text with cited source [XXX].
-
- [XXX]:
-
Easy development tasks to get involved with
-------------------------------------------
@@ -276,4 +269,3 @@
[XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
}}}
-Possible items:
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/32 ===
===========================================================================
version 1
Author: lunar
Date: 2014-08-05T15:55:39+00:00
import template
---
+++ version 1
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+''58th issue of Tor Weekly News. Covering what's happening from August 5th, 2014 to August 12th, 2014. To be released on August 13th, 2014.''
+
+'''Editor:'''
+
+'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — August 13th, 2014
+
+{{{
+========================================================================
+Tor Weekly News August 13th, 2014
+========================================================================
+
+Welcome to the thirty-second issue of Tor Weekly News in 2014, the weekly
+newsletter that covers what is happening in the XXX Tor community.
+
+Feature XXX
+-----------
+
+Feature 1 with cited source [XXX]
+
+ [XXX]:
+
+Monthly status reports for XXX month 2014
+-----------------------------------------
+
+The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
+month of XXX has begun. XXX released his report first [XXX], followed
+by reports from name 2 [XXX], name 3 [XXX], and name 4 [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+
+Miscellaneous news
+------------------
+
+Item 1 with cited source [XXX].
+
+Item 2 with cited source [XXX].
+
+Item 3 with cited source [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+ [XXX]:
+
+Tor help desk roundup
+---------------------
+
+Summary of some questions sent to the Tor help desk.
+
+News from Tor StackExchange
+---------------------------
+
+Text with cited source [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]:
+
+Easy development tasks to get involved with
+-------------------------------------------
+
+Text with cited source [XXX].
+
+ [XXX]:
+
+Upcoming events
+---------------
+
+Jul XX-XX | Event XXX brief description
+ | Event City, Event Country
+ | Event website URL
+ |
+Jul XX-XX | Event XXX brief description
+ | Event City, Event Country
+ | Event website URL
+
+
+This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by XXX, XXX, and
+XXX.
+
+Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
+We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
+important news. Please see the project page [XXX], write down your
+name and subscribe to the team mailing list [XXX] if you want to
+get involved!
+
+ [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
+}}}
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