[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Sep 17 13:00:09 UTC 2013
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2013/11 ===
===========================================================================
version 48
Author: harmony
Date: 2013-09-17T12:28:56+00:00
proper speech marks
--- version 47
+++ version 48
@@ -19,27 +19,27 @@
Another round of speculation regarding the attitude of state surveillance
agencies towards the Tor network was provoked by a slide [XXX] featured in an
-edition of the Brazilian current-affairs show 'Fantástico', broadcast on
+edition of the Brazilian current-affairs show ‘Fantástico’, broadcast on
September 8th [XXX]. The slide, leaked as part of the ongoing Snowden
disclosures, appeared to show a tab in the alleged GCHQ [XXX] FLYING PIG
-surveillance interface labelled 'Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD'. Users
+surveillance interface labelled ‘Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD’. Users
on Reddit [XXX] and Twitter [XXX] began to suggest possible attacks on Tor
that might be managed through such an interface.
Andrew Lewman posted an official response on the Tor Blog [XXX] in which
-he reiterated that "it's not clear what the NSA or GCHQ can or cannot do",
+he reiterated that “it's not clear what the NSA or GCHQ can or cannot do”,
and that well-known theoretical attacks against the Tor network are clearly
described on the project's FAQ page [XXX].
He further added that the tool in question was more likely to involve
-"some "Tor flow detector" scripts that let them pick Tor flows out of a
-set of flows they're looking at" than "anything to do with deanonymizing
+“some “Tor flow detector” scripts that let them pick Tor flows out of a
+set of flows they're looking at” than “anything to do with deanonymizing
Tor users, except insofar as they might have traffic flows from both sides
-of the circuit in their database."
+of the circuit in their database.”
Finally, he remarked that instead of engaging in speculation based on
-limited evidence, "we'd rather spend our time developing Tor and conducting
-research to make a better Tor."
+limited evidence, “we'd rather spend our time developing Tor and conducting
+research to make a better Tor.”
[XXX] https://people.torproject.org/~andrew/2013-09-10-quick-ant-tor-events-qfd.png
[XXX] http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/09/nsa-documents-show-united-states-spied-brazilian-oil-giant.html
@@ -52,30 +52,30 @@
Entry guards and linkability
----------------------------
-Leif Ryge pointed out [XXX] an issue with Tor's current 'entry guards'
+Leif Ryge pointed out [XXX] an issue with Tor's current ‘entry guards’
system, whereby connections entering Tor from different points on the
same network could potentially be linked to an individual user based on
the three entry nodes selected by that user's Tor client, which remain
constant for a period of 4-8 weeks [XXX].
-Leif suggested that "assuming this is an accurate assessment, wouldn't
+Leif suggested that “assuming this is an accurate assessment, wouldn't
it make sense to maintain separate sets of entry guards for each network
-that the user connects from?"
+that the user connects from?”
Nick Mathewson replied [XXX] with an acknowledgement of the problem and
a number of reasons why simply generating separate sets of guards might
-also harm a user's anonymity: "You would *not*, for example, want to
+also harm a user's anonymity: “You would *not*, for example, want to
maintain a different set of entry guards for every IP that you receive,
since if you did, a hostile DHCP server could feed you new IPs until you
picked a hostile guard. Similarly, if you are a busy traveller who changes
your view of what network you are on hundreds or thousands of times, your
-chance of picking a hostile guard would rise accordingly." He also pointed
-out that "having a record in your state file of every network you have
-visited is not necessarily the best idea either."
+chance of picking a hostile guard would rise accordingly.” He also pointed
+out that “having a record in your state file of every network you have
+visited is not necessarily the best idea either.”
Nick concluded by mentioning Roger Dingledine's proposal to lower the
-number of entry guards selected by a client to one only, "to avoid the
-property of letting guard choices identify Tor clients".
+number of entry guards selected by a client to one only, “to avoid the
+property of letting guard choices identify Tor clients”.
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005423.html
[XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
@@ -86,18 +86,18 @@
In response to some confusion on the part of relay operators over the
apparently slow growth in the use of newly-established nodes by clients,
-Roger Dingledine posted on the Tor Blog [XXX] a detailed account of how
+Roger Dingledine posted on the Tor Blog [XXX] a detailed account of how
new relays, and the bandwidth they supply, are gradually integrated into
the Tor network by directory authorities, bandwidth authorities, and clients
-themselves. Roger stressed that "the descriptions here are in part anecdotal".
-
-Roger described the four broad phases that define the development of a
+themselves. Roger stressed that “the descriptions here are in part anecdotal”.
+
+Roger outlined the four broad phases that define the development of a
relay within the network, and finished by offering a number of questions
-for further research, under a general rubric: "what do these phases look
-like with real-world data?" If you would like to contribute to the Tor
+for further research, under a general rubric: “what do these phases look
+like with real-world data?” If you would like to contribute to the Tor
community's understanding of the interaction between individual relays
and the network as a whole, please take a look both at the list of sample
-questions and at Tor's publicly-available archive of metrics data [XXX],
+questions and at Tor's publicly-available archive of metrics data [XXX],
and see what you can find!
[XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
@@ -151,8 +151,8 @@
release of ports updated to the new tor 0.2.4.17-rc [XXX].
Christian Sturm then promptly announced the release of updated packages for
-NetBSD, DragonFly BSD, illumos, Minix, and "other systems potentially using
-pkgsrc" [XXX].
+NetBSD, DragonFly BSD, illumos, Minix, and “other systems potentially using
+pkgsrc” [XXX].
[XXX] http://lists.nycbug.org/pipermail/tor-bsd/2013-September/000044.html
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030036.html
version 47
Author: harmony
Date: 2013-09-17T12:22:20+00:00
proper spaces/added fingerprinting thread link
--- version 46
+++ version 47
@@ -18,18 +18,18 @@
-----------------------------------------
Another round of speculation regarding the attitude of state surveillance
-agencies towards the Tor network was provoked by a slide [XXX] featured in an
+agencies towards the Tor network was provoked by a slide [XXX] featured in an
edition of the Brazilian current-affairs show 'Fantástico', broadcast on
-September 8th [XXX]. The slide, leaked as part of the ongoing Snowden
-disclosures, appeared to show a tab in the alleged GCHQ [XXX] FLYING PIG
+September 8th [XXX]. The slide, leaked as part of the ongoing Snowden
+disclosures, appeared to show a tab in the alleged GCHQ [XXX] FLYING PIG
surveillance interface labelled 'Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD'. Users
-on Reddit [XXX] and Twitter [XXX] began to suggest possible attacks on Tor
+on Reddit [XXX] and Twitter [XXX] began to suggest possible attacks on Tor
that might be managed through such an interface.
-Andrew Lewman posted an official response on the Tor Blog [XXX] in which
+Andrew Lewman posted an official response on the Tor Blog [XXX] in which
he reiterated that "it's not clear what the NSA or GCHQ can or cannot do",
and that well-known theoretical attacks against the Tor network are clearly
-described on the project's FAQ page [XXX].
+described on the project's FAQ page [XXX].
He further added that the tool in question was more likely to involve
"some "Tor flow detector" scripts that let them pick Tor flows out of a
@@ -41,28 +41,28 @@
limited evidence, "we'd rather spend our time developing Tor and conducting
research to make a better Tor."
- [XXX] https://people.torproject.org/~andrew/2013-09-10-quick-ant-tor-events-qfd.png
- [XXX] http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/09/nsa-documents-show-united-states-spied-brazilian-oil-giant.html
- [XXX] https://twitter.com/ggreenwald/status/378185448293552128
- [XXX] http://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/1m3jum/gchq_tor_events_capture/
- [XXX] https://twitter.com/jonathanmayer/status/377292928718499841
- [XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-nsa-gchq-and-quick-ant-speculation
- [XXX] https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#AttacksOnOnionRouting
+ [XXX] https://people.torproject.org/~andrew/2013-09-10-quick-ant-tor-events-qfd.png
+ [XXX] http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/09/nsa-documents-show-united-states-spied-brazilian-oil-giant.html
+ [XXX] https://twitter.com/ggreenwald/status/378185448293552128
+ [XXX] http://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/1m3jum/gchq_tor_events_capture/
+ [XXX] https://twitter.com/jonathanmayer/status/377292928718499841
+ [XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-nsa-gchq-and-quick-ant-speculation
+ [XXX] https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#AttacksOnOnionRouting
Entry guards and linkability
----------------------------
-Leif Ryge pointed out [XXX] an issue with Tor's current 'entry guards'
+Leif Ryge pointed out [XXX] an issue with Tor's current 'entry guards'
system, whereby connections entering Tor from different points on the
same network could potentially be linked to an individual user based on
the three entry nodes selected by that user's Tor client, which remain
-constant for a period of 4-8 weeks [XXX].
+constant for a period of 4-8 weeks [XXX].
Leif suggested that "assuming this is an accurate assessment, wouldn't
it make sense to maintain separate sets of entry guards for each network
that the user connects from?"
-Nick Mathewson replied [XXX] with an acknowledgement of the problem and
+Nick Mathewson replied [XXX] with an acknowledgement of the problem and
a number of reasons why simply generating separate sets of guards might
also harm a user's anonymity: "You would *not*, for example, want to
maintain a different set of entry guards for every IP that you receive,
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@
number of entry guards selected by a client to one only, "to avoid the
property of letting guard choices identify Tor clients".
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005423.html
- [XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005424.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005423.html
+ [XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005424.html
The lifecycle of a new relay: further research needed
-----------------------------------------------------
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@
questions and at Tor's publicly-available archive of metrics data [XXX],
and see what you can find!
- [XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
- [XXX] https://metrics.torproject.org/data.html
+ [XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
+ [XXX] https://metrics.torproject.org/data.html
Food for thought
----------------
@@ -112,29 +112,29 @@
technological problems and the potential to better protect people and
their activities was nice, but the real attraction was to create a
context where people who were sure they should hate each other were
-forced to collaborate.” [XXX]
+forced to collaborate.” [XXX]
— Paul Syverson
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030097.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030097.html
Tor Help Desk Roundup
---------------------
The Tor help desk received a request for assistance setting up Thunderbird to work with Tor.
Thunderbird can be made to route connections through Tor using the TorBirdy add-on.
-Further information about using Tor with Thunderbird can be found on the wiki [XXX].
+Further information about using Tor with Thunderbird can be found on the wiki [XXX].
Another user wrote to comment on the lack of OpenSUSE support on the Tor's rpm
-package page [XXX]. There is an open ticket concerning this issue, but it hasn't
-seen activity for some months [XXX]. A new ticket was opened that addresses this
-concern more specifically [XXX].
-
-
-[XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/torbirdy#BeforeusingTorBirdy
-[XXX] https://www.torproject.org/docs/rpms.html.en
-[XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/4389
-[XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/9718
+package page [XXX]. There is an open ticket concerning this issue, but it hasn't
+seen activity for some months [XXX]. A new ticket was opened that addresses this
+concern more specifically [XXX].
+
+
+[XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/torbirdy#BeforeusingTorBirdy
+[XXX] https://www.torproject.org/docs/rpms.html.en
+[XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/4389
+[XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/9718
Miscellaneous news
@@ -143,67 +143,68 @@
The commitment level for the proposed Tor StackExchange page is hovering
at 82%; it needs to reach 100% before it will be accepted into beta. If
you think you will be able to contribute by answering questions from current or
-potential Tor users, please sign up! [XXX]
-
- [XXX] http://area51.stackexchange.com/proposals/56447/tor-online-anonymity-privacy-and-security
+potential Tor users, please sign up! [XXX]
+
+ [XXX] http://area51.stackexchange.com/proposals/56447/tor-online-anonymity-privacy-and-security
Brian Callahan alerted relay operators running FreeBSD and OpenBSD to the
-release of ports updated to the new tor 0.2.4.17-rc [XXX].
+release of ports updated to the new tor 0.2.4.17-rc [XXX].
Christian Sturm then promptly announced the release of updated packages for
NetBSD, DragonFly BSD, illumos, Minix, and "other systems potentially using
-pkgsrc" [XXX].
-
- [XXX] http://lists.nycbug.org/pipermail/tor-bsd/2013-September/000044.html
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030036.html
-
-Karsten Loesing updated tor's GeoIP database to the newest version [XXX].
+pkgsrc" [XXX].
+
+ [XXX] http://lists.nycbug.org/pipermail/tor-bsd/2013-September/000044.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030036.html
+
+Karsten Loesing updated tor's GeoIP database to the newest version [XXX].
Karsten also published the results of his memory usage test on a version of tor
that reports additional statistics, which he conducted using the Shadow network
-simulator [XXX].
+simulator [XXX].
Finally, Karsten asked for comments on his proposal to retire the old method
of estimating user numbers on the metrics page over the next few weeks in
favor of a more reliable, more efficient system (which has been in beta for
some time already), and with it to remove the accumulated data associated with
-the older method [XXX].
-
- [XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/9714
- [XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7359#comment:18
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005443.html
+the older method [XXX].
+
+ [XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/9714
+ [XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7359#comment:18
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005443.html
Fabio Pietrosanti announced that the available cipher suites for connections
-to tor2web.org have been updated to a much stronger set [XXX].
-
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030003.html
+to tor2web.org have been updated to a much stronger set [XXX].
+
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030003.html
Robert published the results of an investigation into different kinds of
round-trip time (RTT) measurement, and their efficiency in building circuits
-through the Tor network [XXX].
-
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005440.html
+through the Tor network [XXX].
+
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005440.html
George Kadianakis asked for comments on his early draft of a proposal for
different methods of migrating the Hidden Service protocol to a more secure
-version [XXX].
+version [XXX].
George also pushed new versions of obfsproxy (0.2.3) and pyptlib
-(0.0.4) [XXX].
-
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005438.html
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005441.html
+(0.0.4) [XXX].
+
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005438.html
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005441.html
In the course of a thread about the size of browser windows posing a
-fingerprinting threat, harmony discovered that users of Ubuntu's Unity
-desktop should disable the 'automaximize' behavior, as it can override one
-of Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting measures [XXX].
-
- [XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/9738
-
-Tom Lowenthal submitted his monthly status report for August [XXX].
-
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000339.html
+fingerprinting threat [XXX], harmony discovered that users of Ubuntu's Unity
+desktop should disable the ‘automaximize’ behavior, as it can override one
+of Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting measures [XXX].
+
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030022.html
+ [XXX] https://bugs.torproject.org/9738
+
+Tom Lowenthal submitted his monthly status report for August [XXX].
+
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2013-September/000339.html
Upcoming events
---------------
@@ -226,10 +227,10 @@
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
-important news. Please see the project page [XXX], write down your
-name and subscribe to the team mailing list [XXX] if you want to
+important news. Please see the project page [XXX], write down your
+name and subscribe to the team mailing list [XXX] if you want to
get involved!
- [XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
- [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
+ [XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
}}}
version 46
Author: harmony
Date: 2013-09-17T12:09:13+00:00
added link to #12
--- version 45
+++ version 46
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
'''Editor:''' harmony
-'''Status: FROZEN.''' New items should go in next week's edition. Expected release time 2013-09-18 12:00 UTC.
+'''Status: FROZEN.''' New items should go in [wiki:TorWeeklyNews/2013/12 next week's edition]. Expected release time 2013-09-18 12:00 UTC.
'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — September, 18th 2013
version 45
Author: harmony
Date: 2013-09-17T12:00:25+00:00
freeze
--- version 44
+++ version 45
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
''Twelfth issue of Tor Weekly News. Covering what's happening from September 10th, 2013 to September 17th, 2013. To be released on September 18th, 2013.''
'''Editor:''' harmony
+
+'''Status: FROZEN.''' New items should go in next week's edition. Expected release time 2013-09-18 12:00 UTC.
'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — September, 18th 2013
version 44
Author: harmony
Date: 2013-09-17T11:56:03+00:00
small change
--- version 43
+++ version 44
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@
------------------
The commitment level for the proposed Tor StackExchange page is hovering
-at 82%; it needs to reach 100% before it will be accepted. If you think
-you will be able to contribute by answering questions from current or
+at 82%; it needs to reach 100% before it will be accepted into beta. If
+you think you will be able to contribute by answering questions from current or
potential Tor users, please sign up! [XXX]
[XXX] http://area51.stackexchange.com/proposals/56447/tor-online-anonymity-privacy-and-security
version 43
Author: harmony
Date: 2013-09-17T11:52:21+00:00
pre-freeze changes
--- version 42
+++ version 43
@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@
[XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
[XXX] https://metrics.torproject.org/data.html
-Quote of the week
------------------
+Food for thought
+----------------
“Back in the ancient pre-Tor days, at the height of the crypto wars, Ian
Goldberg asked me at Financial Crypto in 1998 why we created onion
@@ -119,9 +119,9 @@
Tor Help Desk Roundup
---------------------
-We received a request for assistance setting up Thunderbird to work with Tor.
+The Tor help desk received a request for assistance setting up Thunderbird to work with Tor.
Thunderbird can be made to route connections through Tor using the TorBirdy add-on.
-Further information about using Tor with Thunderbird can be found on the wiki[XXX].
+Further information about using Tor with Thunderbird can be found on the wiki [XXX].
Another user wrote to comment on the lack of OpenSUSE support on the Tor's rpm
package page [XXX]. There is an open ticket concerning this issue, but it hasn't
@@ -137,6 +137,13 @@
Miscellaneous news
------------------
+
+The commitment level for the proposed Tor StackExchange page is hovering
+at 82%; it needs to reach 100% before it will be accepted. If you think
+you will be able to contribute by answering questions from current or
+potential Tor users, please sign up! [XXX]
+
+ [XXX] http://area51.stackexchange.com/proposals/56447/tor-online-anonymity-privacy-and-security
Brian Callahan alerted relay operators running FreeBSD and OpenBSD to the
release of ports updated to the new tor 0.2.4.17-rc [XXX].
@@ -164,13 +171,6 @@
[XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7359#comment:18
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005443.html
-The commitment level for the proposed Tor StackExchange page is hovering
-at 73%; it needs to reach 100% before it will be accepted. If you think
-you will be able to contribute by answering questions from current or
-potential Tor users, please sign up! [XXX]
-
- [XXX] http://area51.stackexchange.com/proposals/56447/tor-online-anonymity-privacy-and-security
-
Fabio Pietrosanti announced that the available cipher suites for connections
to tor2web.org have been updated to a much stronger set [XXX].
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@
different methods of migrating the Hidden Service protocol to a more secure
version [XXX].
-George also recently pushed new versions of obfsproxy (0.2.3) and pyptlib
+George also pushed new versions of obfsproxy (0.2.3) and pyptlib
(0.0.4) [XXX].
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005438.html
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@
This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by harmony, Lunar, dope457,
-and XXX.
+Matt Pagan, and XXX.
Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
@@ -231,16 +231,3 @@
[XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
}}}
-
-Possible items:
-
-* How about mention Stack Exchange page for Tor? It is getting closer http://area51.stackexchange.com/proposals/56447/tor-online-anonymity-privacy-and-security [done]
-* karsten updated the GeoIP database https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9714 [done]
-* Improvement of SSL Ciphers of Tor2web https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030003.html [done]
-* The lifecycle of a new relay https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay [done]
-* Andrew Lewman on Tor, NSA, GCHQ, and QUICK ANT Speculation https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-nsa-gchq-and-quick-ant-speculation response to http://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/1m3jum/gchq_tor_events_capture/ [done]
-* entry guards and linkability https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005423.html [done]
-* FreeBSD and OpenBSD ports updated http://lists.nycbug.org/pipermail/tor-bsd/2013-September/000044.html [done]
-* FBI Admits It Controlled Tor Servers Behind Mass Malware Attack (waiting for the comments from community) http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/freedom-hosting-fbi/
-* Window size and fingerprinting (will write this up if something new comes of it) https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030022.html [done]
-* Quote by Paul Syverson (I think it is worth mentioning.) https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030097.html [done]
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