[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Oct 15 18:00:04 UTC 2013
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=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2013/15 ===
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version 46
Author: harmony
Date: 2013-10-15T17:21:22+00:00
language fixes
--- version 45
+++ version 46
@@ -77,34 +77,34 @@
Hiding location at the hardware level
-------------------------------------
-One of Tor goals is to hide the location of its users. And it does a
-reasonably good job for Internet connections. But when your threat model
-includes an adversary that can monitor which equipment is connected to a
-local network or monitor Wi-Fi network probes received by many access
-points, extra precaution must be taken.
-
-Ethernet and Wi-Fi cards ship with a factory determined hardware address
-(also called MAC address) that can uniquely identify a computer accross
+One of Tor's goals is to hide the location of its users, and it does a
+reasonably good job of this for Internet connections. But when your
+threat model includes an adversary that can monitor which equipment is
+connected to a local network, or monitor Wi-Fi network probes received
+by many access points, extra precautions must be taken.
+
+Ethernet and Wi-Fi cards ship with a factory-determined hardware address
+(also called a MAC address) that can uniquely identify a computer across
networks. Thankfully, most devices allow their hardware address to be
changed by an operating system.
As the Tails live operating system aims to protect the privacy and
-anonymity of its users, it's been a long requested feature [9] to have
-it automatically randomize MAC addresses. Some important progress has
-been made as anonym requested comments [10] on a detailed analysis on
-why, when and how Tails should automatically randomize MAC addresses.
-
-In his analysis, anonym describes a Tails user wanting to hide their
+anonymity of its users, it has long been suggested [9] that it should
+automatically randomize MAC addresses. Some important progress has been
+made, and this week anonym requested comments [10] on a detailed
+analysis of why, when and how Tails should randomize MAC addresses.
+
+In this analysis, anonym describes a Tails user wanting to hide their
geographical movement and not be identified as using Tails, but who also
-want to “avoid alarming the local administrators (imagine a situation
+wants to “avoid alarming the local administrators (imagine a situation
where security guards are sent to investigate an ‘alien computer’ at
your workplace, or similar)” and “avoid network connection problems due
to MAC address white-listing, hardware or driver issues, or similar”.
The analysis then tries to understand when MAC address should be
-randomized depending on several combination of locations and devices.
-The outcome is that “this feature enabled by default, with the
-possibility to opt-out.” anonym then dwelves into user interface and
+randomized depending on several combinations of locations and devices.
+The outcome is that “this feature is enabled by default, with the
+possibility to opt-out.” anonym then delves into user interface and
implementation considerations.
If you are interested in the analysis, or curious about how you could
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