[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Tue Oct 15 11:40:05 UTC 2013
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2013/15 ===
===========================================================================
version 42
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-10-15T11:09:46+00:00
minor rewording
--- version 41
+++ version 42
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@
Ethernet and Wi-Fi cards ship with a factory determined hardware address (also
called MAC address) that can uniquely identify a computer accross networks.
-Thankfully, most devices allow their hardware address to be configured
-differently by an operating system.
+Thankfully, most devices allow their hardware address to be changed by an
+operating system.
As the Tails live operating system aims to protect the privacy and anonymity of
its users, it's been a long requested feature [XXX] to have it automatically
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
In his analysis, anonym describes a Tails user wanting to hide their
geographical movement and not be identified as using Tails, but who also want
-to “avoid alarming the the local administrators (imagine a situation where
+to “avoid alarming the local administrators (imagine a situation where
security guards are sent to investigate an ‘alien computer’ at your workplace,
or similar)” and “avoid network connection problems due to MAC address
white-listing, hardware or driver issues, or similar”.
version 41
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-10-15T10:59:02+00:00
add link
--- version 40
+++ version 41
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@
differently by an operating system.
As the Tails live operating system aims to protect the privacy and anonymity of
-its users, it's been a long requested feature to have it automatically
+its users, it's been a long requested feature [XXX] to have it automatically
randomize MAC addresses. Some important progress has been made as anonym
requested comments [XXX] on a detailed analysis on why, when and how Tails
should automatically randomize MAC addresses.
@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@
If you are intersted the analysis, or curious on how you could help with the
proposed implementation, be sure to have a look!
-[XXX] https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2013-October/003835.html
+ [XXX] https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5421
+ [XXX] https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2013-October/003835.html
Tor Help Desk Roundup
---------------------
version 40
Author: lunar
Date: 2013-10-15T10:58:29+00:00
expand on mac address spoofing
--- version 39
+++ version 40
@@ -69,6 +69,43 @@
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-October/005596.html
[XXX] https://ooni.torproject.org/
+Hiding location at the hardware level
+-------------------------------------
+
+One of Tor goals is to hide the location of its users. And it does a reasonably
+good job for Internet connections. But when your threat model includes an
+adversary that can monitor which equipment is connected to a local network or
+monitor Wi-Fi network probes received by many access points, extra precaution
+must be taken.
+
+Ethernet and Wi-Fi cards ship with a factory determined hardware address (also
+called MAC address) that can uniquely identify a computer accross networks.
+Thankfully, most devices allow their hardware address to be configured
+differently by an operating system.
+
+As the Tails live operating system aims to protect the privacy and anonymity of
+its users, it's been a long requested feature to have it automatically
+randomize MAC addresses. Some important progress has been made as anonym
+requested comments [XXX] on a detailed analysis on why, when and how Tails
+should automatically randomize MAC addresses.
+
+In his analysis, anonym describes a Tails user wanting to hide their
+geographical movement and not be identified as using Tails, but who also want
+to “avoid alarming the the local administrators (imagine a situation where
+security guards are sent to investigate an ‘alien computer’ at your workplace,
+or similar)” and “avoid network connection problems due to MAC address
+white-listing, hardware or driver issues, or similar”.
+
+The analysis then tries to understand when MAC address should be randomized
+depending on several combination of locations and devices. The outcome is that
+“this feature enabled by default, with the possibility to opt-out.” anonym then
+dwelves into user interface and implementation considerations.
+
+If you are intersted the analysis, or curious on how you could help with the
+proposed implementation, be sure to have a look!
+
+[XXX] https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2013-October/003835.html
+
Tor Help Desk Roundup
---------------------
@@ -104,11 +141,6 @@
[XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/stem-release-11
[XXX] https://stem.torproject.org/change_log.html#version-1-1
-
-anonym sent out a request for comments on a detailed proposal to implement
-a MAC address-spoofing feature in the Tails Greeter [XXX].
-
-[XXX] https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2013-October/003835.html
Arlo Breault sent out a detailed plan on how Mozilla Instantbird could
be turned into the Tor Messenger [XXX]. Feedback would be welcome,
@@ -179,4 +211,4 @@
[XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
[XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
-}}}+}}}
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