[metrics-bugs] #34257 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Analyze unusual distribution of time to extend to first hop in circuit
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Thu May 21 16:39:59 UTC 2020
#34257: Analyze unusual distribution of time to extend to first hop in circuit
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Reporter: karsten | Owner: metrics-team
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Metrics/Onionperf | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor: Sponsor59-must
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Comment (by dennis.jackson):
The following is all fairly speculative, as I just went looking for
patterns. I started out by looking at the histograms for each variable,
broken down by source. I noticed that `bt1` on hk has discrete bands,
rather than a continuous distribution:
[[Image(https://raw.githubusercontent.com/galadran/onionperf-guard-
analysis/master/images/histograms/bt1_op-hk2.png, 90%,align=center)]]
Contrastingly, the other distributions for `bt1`,`bt2`, `btn` on hk and
other services are continuous. E.g:
[[Image(https://raw.githubusercontent.com/galadran/onionperf-guard-
analysis/master/images/histograms/btn_op-hk2.png, 90%,align=center)]]
I then went looking for correlations in a very unscientific manner. I
filtered the data into different aggregates based on the source server and
the type of circuit, then looked at the fields: `start2req`, `req2fb` and
`total_build` where `total_build`is the sum `bt1+bt2+btn`. Looking at
Spearman's Correlation Coefficient, with results broken down in terms of
strength of correlation:
{{{
['op-nl2,public,start2req,req2fb', 0.6663782621968707]
['op-us2,public,start2req,req2fb', 0.6516485005115249]
['op-hk2,public,start2req,req2fb', 0.6262807105324466]
}}}
So across all servers, increasing the time until use increased the
eventual RTT. Makes sense.
{{{
['op-nl2,public,start2req,total_build', 0.6297887235661617]
['op-us2,public,start2req,total_build', 0.43186586805012234]
['op-hk2,public,start2req,total_build', 0.4421435991718628]
}}}
The NL server's time till use has a strong correlation with the total
build time for normal circuits. But the relationship is much weaker for HK
and USA.
{{{
['op-nl2,public,req2fb,total_build', 0.5314680670242597]
['op-us2,public,req2fb,total_build', 0.4231599798026954]
['op-hk2,public,req2fb,total_build', 0.35395772056800157]
}}}
The same pattern holds here, which is slightly confusing. Why is more of
the RTT latency "explained" by the total build time for NL rather than
other servers?
There's a similar pattern for onion circuits, but with much weaker
correlations presumably due to the additional hops :
{{{
['op-nl2,onion,req2fb,total_build', 0.4868140884875895]
['op-us2,onion,req2fb,total_build', 0.3423980259990133]
['op-hk2,onion,req2fb,total_build', 0.36115525053999625]
}}}
{{{
['op-nl2,onion,start2req,req2fb', 0.3232570551972543]
['op-us2,onion,start2req,req2fb', 0.27044144121735336]
['op-hk2,onion,start2req,req2fb', 0.22256596270882092
}}}
{{{
['op-nl2,onion,start2req,total_build', 0.20790575010475945]
['op-us2,onion,start2req,total_build', 0.18638791398671606]
['op-hk2,onion,start2req,total_build', 0.13381509033834854]
}}}
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/34257#comment:3>
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