[metrics-bugs] #20907 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Blocking of public relays in Belarus, 2016-12-01

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#20907: Blocking of public relays in Belarus, 2016-12-01
-----------------------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  dcf                          |          Owner:  metrics-team
     Type:  project                      |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                       |      Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                       |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block by          |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                               |         Points:
 Reviewer:                               |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------------------+------------------------------
Description changed by dcf:

Old description:

> Direct users decreased from 5,500 to 3,000 over a few days starting on
> November 30 or December 1. Bridge users simultaneously increased, from
> 250 to 2,000.
>
> [[Image(userstats-relay-country-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-06-off.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
> country.html?start=2016-09-07&end=2016-12-06&country=by&events=off link]
>
> [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-06.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> country.html?start=2016-09-07&end=2016-12-06&country=by link]
>
> [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-06.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> combined.html?start=2016-09-07&end=2016-12-06&country=by link]

New description:

 Direct users decreased from 5,500 to 3,000 over a few days starting on
 November 30 or December 1. Bridge users simultaneously increased, from 250
 to 2,000.

 OONI blog post: [https://ooni.torproject.org/post/belarus-fries-onion/
 urandom.pcap: Belarus (finally) bans Tor]:
 > 1. Tor directory authorities are not blocked
 > 2. Public onion routers have their ORPort blocked by TCP RST injection
 > 3. The onion routers’ DirPort is not blocked
 > 4. Plain-old non-obfuscated Tor Bridges from BridgeDB circumvent the
 interference
 > 5. Beltelecom (or its upstream) has strange configuration of the
 networking gear injecting reset packets

 [[Image(userstats-relay-country-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-11-off.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2016-09-07&end=2016-12-11&country=by&events=off link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-11.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.html?start=2016-09-07&end=2016-12-11&country=by link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-by-2016-09-07-2016-12-11.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.html?start=2016-09-07&end=2016-12-11&country=by link]

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20907#comment:4>
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